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Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover 
KATHERINE SHAW* AND ALEX STEIN† 
The constitutional law of abortion stands on the untenable assumption that any 
state’s abortion regulations impact citizens of that state alone. On this understand-
ing, the state’s boundaries demarcate the terrain on which women’s right to abortion 
clashes with state power to regulate that right.  
This Article uncovers a previously unnoticed horizontal dimension of abortion 
regulation: the medical-malpractice penalties imposed upon doctors for failing to 
inform patients about abortion risks; the states’ power to define those risks, along 
with doctors’ informed-consent obligations and penalties; and, critically, the possi-
bility that such standards might cross state lines. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and 
other decisions that have approved abortion-specific informed-consent requirements 
have failed to account for this interstate dynamic. 
In recent years, fourteen states, led by South Dakota, have enacted statutes that 
direct doctors to warn patients, as part of an informed-consent dialogue, that abor-
tion might cause depression and even suicide ideation and actual suicide. Although 
there is broad medical consensus that such warnings are unnecessary, courts have 
nonetheless concluded that the Supreme Court’s Casey decision shields them from 
constitutional challenge. This may have implications not just in the states that man-
date such warnings, but nationwide. Because doctors’ informed-consent obligations 
incorporate medical information and practices from other jurisdictions, a doctor’s 
failure to warn a patient about postabortion depression may expose her to liability 
for medical malpractice—even where her own state does not mandate such a warn-
ing statutorily. Eliminating this risk by warning a patient that abortion might lead to 
depression costs the doctor much less than the penalties she might incur for with-
holding that information.  
This dynamic—which we term the “South Dakota effect”—threatens to transform 
informed-consent practices across the country, with profound consequences for 
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women’s willingness to elect abortion and for the experiences of women who choose 
to go forward with abortion procedures. More broadly, it highlights the need to re-
think the abortion-federalism nexus. 
 
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 2 
I. SPECIAL INFORMED-CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ABORTION ........................... 10 
A. THE “RIGHT TO KNOW” ............................................................................ 10 
B. THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW ........................................................................ 19 
II. THE SOUTH DAKOTA EFFECT ............................................................................. 21 
A. REGULATORY SPILLOVER ......................................................................... 22 
B. INTERSTATE MIGRATION OF POSTABORTION DEPRESSION WARNINGS ..... 24 
C. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ............................................................................... 36 
III. SOLUTIONS ........................................................................................................ 42 
A. FEDERALIZING INFORMED CONSENT ......................................................... 44 
1. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION ........................................................... 45 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION ....................................................... 47 
B. A STATE-BY-STATE SOLUTION ................................................................. 52 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 53 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Profound state variation has long characterized our law of abortion. In 1973, the 
year Roe v. Wade1 was decided, thirty-one states prohibited abortion except where 
necessary to save a woman’s life.2 In a number of states, criminal prosecutions of 
doctors who performed abortions were common;3 in some of those states, not just 
doctors but also patients could in theory face criminal penalties.4 On the other end of 
the spectrum, by 1973, four states5 broadly permitted “abortion without restriction 
‘early’ in pregnancy,”6 and a number of other states had liberalized their abortion 
laws to varying degrees.7 
Roe, of course, dramatically changed the constitutional landscape, holding that 
the Constitution protects—at least to some degree—a woman’s right to decide for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a 
Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 614 (2007). 
 3. Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2010).  
 4. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA, RACHEL BENSON GOLD, CORY L. RICHARDS & LAWRENCE B. 
FINER, GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION IN WOMEN’S LIVES 11 (2006). 
 5. Those states were New York, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska. Rachel Benson Gold, 
Lessons From Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Mar. 
2003, at 8. 
 6. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions 
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2047 (2011). 
 7. BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 12; see also LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, 
BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RULING 120–22 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010). 
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herself whether to terminate a pregnancy.8 Accordingly, Roe invalidated state laws 
that wholesale prohibited abortion. But the Roe Court continued to credit a strong 
state interest in regulating abortion, including in order to promote potential life.9 
Crafting a trimester framework to balance these competing interests, Roe held that 
during the first trimester of pregnancy, when abortion is relatively uncomplicated 
and the fetus cannot live outside the womb, a woman’s privacy and autonomy inter-
ests trump any state interest in regulation. As the pregnancy progresses, the state’s 
interest in regulation becomes stronger, so that by the beginning of the third trimester, 
the state can prohibit abortion outright, except where necessary to preserve a 
woman’s life or health.10  
Roe’s preservation of state regulatory prerogatives meant that state law continued 
to vary dramatically in the post-Roe era. And the most significant post-Roe case, 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 only increased states’ 
regulatory power in the context of abortion. Dispensing altogether with Roe’s tri-
mester framework, Casey held that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating to 
protect women’s health and safety, and to promote potential life, for the duration of 
a pregnancy.12 Under Casey’s framework, abortion regulations will be sustained so 
long as they do not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy prior to viability.13 Application of the undue burden stand-
ard—which permits regulations that do not have the “purpose or effect” of “plac[ing] 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion”14—has vindicated 
state regulation of abortion facilities, procedures, and decisions. Among other things, 
it has allowed states to prescribe special rules for informed consent to abortion,15 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 640–41 
(2008) (“Although the formal doctrine remains largely the same since Roe, the underlying 
right has evolved dramatically from a relational right protective of physician and patient au-
tonomy to an individualistic right held by the woman alone.”). 
 9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (recognizing “the State’s important and legiti-
mate interest in potential life”). 
 10. Id. at 164–66. 
 11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 12. Id. at 846. 
 13. Id. at 878. Following viability, the balance of interests tilts sharply in favor of the 
state, which may regulate to the point of prohibition so long as the law contains an exception 
to preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 879. For powerful contemporary analysis of 
Casey’s “undue burden” doctrine, see Reva Siegel & Linda Greenhouse, Casey and the Clinic 
Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428 (2016). 
 14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.  
 15. In Casey itself, the Court upheld provisions of Pennsylvania law that required physi-
cians to “inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and 
of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child,’” in addition to advising 
the woman of “the availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus 
and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child 
support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as 
alternatives to abortion.” Id. at 881; see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 471–72 (7th Cir. 
1999) (upholding Wisconsin statute requiring doctors to inform women seeking abortions of 
“the ‘medical risks’ associated with abortion including the risk of ‘psychological trauma,’” 
but allowing doctors to exercise “best medical judgment” in determining exact contents of 
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exposing the rules’ violators to a range of sanctions, including liability for medical 
malpractice.16 States defend these rules as informing, rather than hindering, women’s 
choice.17 And courts have for the most part credited such justifications.18 
Consider the South Dakota statute that requires abortion providers to tell patients 
seeking abortions that “the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being”; that abortion might lead to “[d]epression and related 
psychological distress” or “[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide”; and that 
pregnant women are eligible for childbirth and neonatal support.19 As a matter of 
state law, failure to provide such warnings will violate the patient’s right to informed 
consent and expose violators to liability for malpractice and other penalties.20 The 
statute essentially compels doctors to urge women to reconsider abortion decisions. 
To that end, it introduces a mandatory warning that amalgamates controversial and 
contested information, gives that information official recognition, and uses doctors 
to make the information appear credible.21 
                                                                                                                 
 
warnings); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 1994) (uphold-
ing North Dakota law similar to Pennsylvania informed consent provision at issue in Casey). 
 16. In every state, violation of a patient’s right to informed consent is actionable in tort. 
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 6.3 (1999). In addition, the statutes we address here desig-
nate women seeking abortions as their beneficiaries, which makes their breaches actionable. 
See id. § 6.4, at 146–50 (victims of health and safety statutes’ violations can generally sue 
violators in tort); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion 
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1724 (2008) (observing that, after Roe 
v. Wade, the antiabortion movement mobilized medical malpractice and informed-consent 
laws to block women’s access to abortion).  
 17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (finding “no unconstitutional hindrance of the woman’s choice” in state-
mandated advisory linking abortion and suicide). 
 18. See, e.g., id.; Karlin, 188 F.3d at 471; Fargo Women’s Health, 18 F.3d at 531. We 
should note that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
No. 15-274 (U.S. June 27, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-274_p8k0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28S6-EZSW]—which struck down a law requiring Texas clinics to conform 
to the requirements of ambulatory surgical centers and doctors who perform abortions to have 
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals—demonstrated that the “undue burden” standard does 
not authorize any abortion regulation a state might devise. To date, the decision has not had 
any impact on abortion-specific informed-consent requirements of the sort we discuss here. 
But the opinion does suggest an active judicial role in carefully scrutinizing the medical claims 
upon which abortion regulations are predicated. See id. at 20 (describing “[t]he statement that 
legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty” as “inconsistent 
with this Court’s case law”). So it may well be deployed in renewed attacks on the constitu-
tionality of such laws.  
 19. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-1.7, -10.1(1), (2) (2011). For a discussion of laws 
like South Dakota’s as a form of “abortion exceptionalism”—that is, the singling out of abor-
tion “for more restrictive government regulation as compared to other, similar procedures”—
see generally Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling 
Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3, 6 (2012). 
 20. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1.7 (2011); see also supra note 16 (discussing tort li-
ability). Other penalties extend to the criminal. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.2 (2011) 
(“Statement of informed consent—Misdemeanor . . . .”). 
 21. See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. Similarly motivated statutes in other 
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Animating this statute is an antiabortion policy of the sort the Supreme Court 
credited as legitimate in both Roe and Casey.22 The majority of South Dakotans ap-
pear to support this policy.23 Residents who favor unrestricted abortion rights have 
no real voice in South Dakota. Under conventional theories of federalism, their only 
remedy is exit: all they can do is move to a state whose abortion laws are less restric-
tive.24 Whatever the minority-view holders choose to do, the statute will remain the 
law of South Dakota; its effects will be felt within the state’s borders, and, so long 
as the statute does not contravene constitutional limits—as the Eighth Circuit has 
                                                                                                                 
 
states require doctors to provide empirically unsupported warnings that tie abortion to breast 
cancer. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(a)(3), -6710(a)(2)–(3) (Supp. 2014) (mandat-
ing that doctors tell patients that abortion may cause breast cancer when this risk is objectively 
present); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242(a)(1)(i) (West 2011) (same, but with a proviso that 
information must be provided “when medically accurate”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
33(1)(a)(ii) (West 2007) (same as Minnesota); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(5)(a)(i) (2015) 
(same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2015) 
(same); see also Div. of Pub. Health, Possible Medical Risks or Complications of Abortion, 
ALASKA DEP’T HEALTH & SOC. SERVS. (2015), http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages 
/informedconsent/abortion/risks.aspx [https://perma.cc/EX67-B7MJ] (mentioning that “the 
American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists . . . supports the view that 
there is a causal relationship between breast cancer and the termination of pregnancy”). See 
generally infra note 69 (listing studies repudiating the cancer-abortion link). 
 22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (“[T]he State may 
enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [a woman] to know that there are philo-
sophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing 
the pregnancy to full term . . . . ‘[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to 
democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth.’” (quoting Webster 
v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989))). 
 23. See REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 4 (2005), 
http://www.dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%20Abortion%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H3PD-B2CC] (noting that the Task Force was created by a vote of 63-4 in 
the House and 28-6 in the Senate); Steven Ertelt, South Dakota Polls Show Conflicting Result 
on Abortion Ban’s Future, LIFENEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2007), http://archive.lifenews.com 
/state2607.html [https://perma.cc/3PZU-UKF9] (reporting that polls show a majority of South 
Dakotans support a ban on abortions except for life-saving purposes and in cases of rape and 
incest). 
 24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 893 (8th ed. 2011) (“[P]eople 
can sort themselves between states in accordance with their preferences. The right to move to 
a different state supplements voting power in controlling the action of government officials.”); 
Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 
(1992) (“Federalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet.”); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Response, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 973, 982 (2002) (“[A] citizen of Texas who finds that state’s prohibitions on same sex 
relations too onerous can move to Vermont, while a citizen of New York whose desire to own 
assault weapons is unrealizable can move to Montana.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Fergus Ryan, 
The Geography of Abortion (Dec. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2702506 [https://perma.cc/RUE6-R5NN] (tying Ireland’s restrictive abortion rights 
to the freedom to travel and wide accessibility of abortion in the nearby Great Britain). See 
generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–5 (1970).  
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concluded25—neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has any say in this intrastate 
business. 
But what if the impact of South Dakota’s regulation is not limited to South 
Dakota?26 In this Article, we argue that the critical assumption that laws like South 
Dakota’s have no interstate effects misses a key aspect of the doctrine of informed 
consent and its impact on doctors’ behavior. Specifically, this assumption ignores 
the effect of the emergence and official ratification of new medical information and 
practices—including information and practices with contestable credentials—on 
doctors’ disclosure obligations. Attending to the operation of the law of informed 
consent reveals that state medical malpractice laws pose a hitherto unrecognized 
threat both to women’s exercise of abortion rights nationwide and to the basic prin-
ciple that each state may decide for itself how to balance the competing interests at 
stake in abortion.  
The mechanism by which state regulations like South Dakota’s might impose 
spillover effects on other states—including states whose laws provide for relatively 
broad access to abortion27—is straightforward. Two distinct paradigms govern infor-
mation disclosure in the context of informed consent. Thirty states follow the “doc-
tors’ custom” standard, which requires doctors to inform patients about the nature, 
risks, and benefits of a treatment, along with the medically approved alternatives, to 
the extent that such disclosure is customary within the medical profession.28 The re-
maining twenty states and the District of Columbia use the “patient expectation” 
standard, under which doctors must tell patients everything that a reasonable patient 
would wish to know about the treatment and its alternatives.29 Critically for purposes 
of the present discussion, the “patient expectation” standard generally requires doc-
tors to inform patients about a risk of death or serious harm even when that risk is 
extremely low.30 The “doctors’ custom” standard, on the other hand, does not recog-
nize this disclosure obligation.31 Under both standards, a doctor’s failure to provide 
requisite information to her patient constitutes an actionable tort.32 Under this frame-
work, state regulation that requires doctors to advise pregnant women that abortion 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905–06 (8th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (upholding South Dakota’s suicide proviso against constitutional challenge); 
see also Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 673 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding 
general risk advisory), vacated in part on rehearing en banc, 662 F.3d 1072 (2011). 
 26. But see Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the 
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1338 (2009) (observing that states like South Dakota that 
“push the boundaries of Casey are few in number and limited in influence”). 
 27. See generally GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE 
ABORTION LAW (2016). 
 28. See infra notes 148–50 and Table 1. 
 29. See infra notes 148–50 and Table 1. 
 30. See infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra note 89 and sources cited therein. 
 32. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1.7 (2011) (“The South Dakota common law 
cause of action for medical malpractice informed consent claims based upon the reasonable 
patient standard is reaffirmed and is hereby expressly declared to apply to all abortion proce-
dures.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(i)–(ii) (2011) (specifying South Dakota’s 
special informed consent requirements for abortion, which include providing “[a] description 
of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk factors to which 
2016] ABORTION AND REGULATORY SPILLOVER  7 
 
might lead to serious depression or suicide will gradually spread to other states, 
whose doctors will begin providing similar warnings as part of their informed-
consent dialogues with patients. This dynamic will first unfold in the states that fol-
low the “patient expectation” standard. Under this standard, depression and suicide 
squarely fall into the “death or serious harm” category. For that reason, information 
about even a low probability of postabortion depression or suicide, ratified by an-
other state in the form of mandatory warnings, may fall within the scope of disclosure 
that a reasonable patient would expect from her doctor.33 This reasonable expectation 
will gradually compel doctors to begin warning patients about postabortion depres-
sion and suicide. Failure to give this warning may expose doctors to liability for 
malpractice and possible blacklisting in the National Practitioner Data Bank.34 The 
“depression and suicide” warning will thus spread across all states that follow the 
“patient expectation” standard. 
Because those states are numerous, their adoption of the “depression and suicide” 
warning will gradually change doctors’ practices nationwide. We expect this change 
to occur due to two factors. The first factor is the negligible cost of the warning: it 
costs doctors very little35 to provide the “depression and suicide” warning in their 
conversations with patients or in the office paperwork that patients must read and 
sign. The second factor is doctors’ aversion to the risk of malpractice liability. To 
reduce this risk, doctors develop special protocols known as defensive medicine.36 
Overinforming patients about remote risks is one of those protocols.37 We call this 
regulatory spillover the “South Dakota effect.” This spillover is analogous to the 
famous California effect in environmental regulation.38 California’s hydrocarbon and 
                                                                                                                 
 
the pregnant woman would be subjected,” including “[d]epression and related psychological 
distress” as well as “increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide”). In South Dakota, any 
such violation is also punishable criminally as a Class 2 misdemeanor. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 34-23A-10.2 (2011). 
 33. See infra notes 89–94, 120–22 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 35. We ignore ideological costs here.  
 36. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Essay, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence 
on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 537–38, 545–46 (2010) (showing that self-
interested doctors use defensive medicine to create evidence that fends off malpractice suits); 
see also Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 1339, 1368–69 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (discussing 
defensive medicine); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Essay, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for 
National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 852–54 (2009) 
(same). Arguably, a doctor’s warning about postabortion depression might drive away pa-
tients, which might result in a loss of income. We estimate that the loss-of-income scenario is 
unlikely, since a patient opting out of the procedure frees up time for another patient. Further-
more, an economically minded doctor would rather lose a patient than expose herself to the 
risk of malpractice liability. 
 37. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 36, at 545–46; cf. James Gibson, Doctrinal 
Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1644–45, 1653–61 (2008) (arguing 
that risk-averse doctors tend to prefer excessive treatment options that fend off malpractice 
suits and that such practices gradually transform into legally binding customs). Our argument 
applies to all doctors, regardless of their attitude toward risk.  
 38. We present here a simplified version of the California effect. For further details and 
8 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1 
 
nitrogen oxide emission standards for cars are more stringent than the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency requirements. Compliance with California’s de-
manding standards increases car production costs, but manufacturers must incur this 
additional expense in order to sell their cars to Californians. California’s market for 
cars is simply too big to pass up. Furthermore, making cars with different emission 
systems that satisfy different regulatory requirements is far too complicated. Manu-
facturers consequently prefer to use California’s emission standards for all cars.39  
A similar cost-benefit calculation may motivate doctors across the United States 
to add South Dakota–style “depression and suicide” warnings to their disclosure di-
alogues. South Dakota is not a large enough state to give global effect to its informed-
consent requirements for abortion. Yet, together with a few like-minded states, it has 
managed to create a liability threat for all doctors and an option to remove that threat 
at very low cost.40 Although our account of the South Dakota effect is largely theo-
retical, there is evidence that the threat has already begun to materialize.41  
Because of the self-updating nature of informed consent, requirements like South 
Dakota’s may have implications that cut across state lines. These implications in-
clude the interstate dissemination of potentially misleading information about the 
risks of abortion. The medical community holds that abortion is not causally con-
nected to suicide, depression, breast cancer, infertility, or other ailments.42 This view 
is well grounded in empirical research.43 Because abortion can be a stressful event, 
it may have undesirable psychological effects; but research suggests that for an av-
erage woman with no psychiatric history, postpartum depression is at least as likely 
as postabortion depression.44 
For these reasons, we believe legislative intervention is required to eliminate the 
South Dakota effect. This intervention could follow two distinct paths. First, 
Congress could act to eliminate the South Dakota effect. A number of scholars have 
                                                                                                                 
 
insightful analysis, see Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1097, 1107–12 (2009). 
 39. For other influential analyses of the California effect, see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: 
CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259–60 (1995) (de-
scribing and analyzing the California effect); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1, 19–35 (2012) (arguing that the European Union unilaterally globalizes its regula-
tions and identifying this “Brussels effect” as a global variant of the “California effect”). 
 40. See infra Part II.A. 
 41. See infra Part II.B. 
 42. See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 44. Trine Munk-Olsen, Thomas Munk Laursen, Carsten B. Pederson, Øjvind Lidegaard 
& Preben Bo Mortensen, Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 334–36 (2011) (finding, in population-based cohort study of Danish 
women, that incidence of psychiatric treatment increased after childbirth, but not abortion); 
Julia R. Steinberg, Davida Becker & Jillian T. Henderson, Does the Outcome of a First 
Pregnancy Predict Depression, Suicidal Ideation, or Lower Self-Esteem? Data from the 
National Comorbidity Survey, 81 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 193, 196 (2011) (finding “no dif-
ferences between women who aborted versus delivered in postpregnancy depression when 
controlling for background and economic characteristics, prepregnancy violence experience, 
or prepregnancy mental health”). For a more detailed survey of the literature, see infra note 72 
and accompanying text. 
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recently argued that Congress is best situated to mediate certain sorts of interstate 
spillovers,45 and the dynamic we identify is ripe for such intervention. As we show, 
Congress has ample Commerce Clause power to enact a statute designed to prevent 
the South Dakota effect. The federal statute we envision would protect doctors not 
subject to state-mandated heightened warnings from the imposition of the South 
Dakota standard. Alternatively, states could block the South Dakota effect by enact-
ing statutes similar to the federal statute described above. 
We should note before proceeding further that a number of scholars have raised 
serious constitutional objections to laws like South Dakota’s. Among other things, 
they argue that these laws violate Casey’s requirement that state-mandated warnings 
be “truthful and not misleading”46 and thus constitute an undue burden;47 that they 
reveal the “untenability” of the compromise struck in Casey;48 and that they compel 
physician speech in violation of the First Amendment.49 These laws have not been 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (“[T]he federal government 
is more likely than the states to solve the problem of interstate spillovers.”); Heather K. Gerken 
& Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 
108 (2014) (“Congress’s lawmaking power makes it a natural choice for those aggrieved by 
an interstate spillover and seeking a referee.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and 
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1479, 1531 (2007) (“[T]he Constitution assigns 
the primary role of interstate umpire to Congress. . . . Assigning Congress [this] role . . . not 
only reflects constitutional text and structure, but also furthers federalism values and has some 
historical support.”).  
 46. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion).  
 47. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social 
Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (“[I]n light 
of what we now know about the effect of fear appeals and persuasion under the influence of 
anxiety, there is a legitimate case for closer scrutiny under Casey of the effect such State-
provided information has on the decision-making of women seeking abortion . . . .”); Rebecca 
Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1621 (2008) (“Casey’s standard calls into question state mandates to 
warn women considering abortion about unfounded hazards, such as . . . serious psychological 
problems.”); Siegel, supra note 16, at 1758 (arguing that much of Casey aligns with “ordinary 
informed consent practice . . . designed to facilitate a patient’s consideration of risks and bene-
fits of the treatment decision and its alternatives, presented in a balanced and even-handed 
way” and suggesting that regulation inconsistent with such principles may constitute an “un-
due burden”); see also, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis 
Pregnancy Centers, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51, 
56 (2015) (“For poor women . . . the mandatory counseling and waiting period laws increase 
the personal and financial costs of obtaining an abortion and prevent women from accessing 
abortion services.”); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden 
Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1054–56 (2014) (criticizing courts for allowing 
compliance with Casey standards to preempt every constitutional challenge to abortion 
regulation). 
 48. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of 
Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 324 (2010) (“The ‘compromise’ that 
Casey struck is an untenable one. . . . [It has] encouraged legislatures to pass abortion re-
strictions in fact based on moral norms but couched as grounded in scientific evidence.”). 
 49. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1290–91 
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comprehensively tested in courts, and arguments against their constitutionality may 
yet carry the day. Rather than enter that constitutional debate, however, our project 
aims to shift the focus to another important aspect of these laws—from their 
standalone (un)constitutionality to a consideration of their interstate effects.50  
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we survey and criticize the 
informed-consent statutes of South Dakota and like-minded states. In Part II, we 
identify and examine the South Dakota effect. In Part III, we develop our law-reform 
proposals and explain their advantages and shortcomings. A short Conclusion 
follows. 
I. SPECIAL INFORMED-CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ABORTION 
A. The “Right To Know” 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,51 the Supreme 
Court held that states have a legitimate and substantial interest in apprising women 
of “the health risks of abortion,”52 including harm to a woman’s “psychological well-
being.”53 Accordingly, it held that states may require doctors to give women 
                                                                                                                 
 
(2014) (arguing that abortion-related disclosure mandates are “out of step with prevailing free 
speech jurisprudence”); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016) 
(theorizing First Amendment protection of professional speech as a freedom of medical and 
other professional communities to generate and disseminate knowledge); David Orentlicher, 
Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9, 9 (2015) (arguing that 
ideology-driven disclosure mandates violate doctors’ free speech rights); Robert Post, 
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 989 (arguing that South Dakota’s depression and suicide warnings 
violate the First Amendment insofar as they force physicians “to express views that contradict 
and undermine the authority of medical knowledge”); cf. Sonia M. Suter, The First 
Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
22, 25–28 (2015) (arguing that professional speech in informed-consent context has high value 
and that its regulation therefore requires heightened, and at times strict, First Amendment scru-
tiny); Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1330 (2015) 
(“[W]hen [the state] engages in an ideological assault on the constitutional right to abortion . . . 
the state is no longer simply ensuring that women's informed consent is obtained. . . . The First 
Amendment is not merely ‘implicated’ when states pass ideological abortion disclosure laws; 
it is threatened in unique ways.” (footnote omitted)). 
 50. We should note, in addition, the problematic nature of discussing informed-consent 
laws in the register of patient rights and autonomy. Rather than attempt to actually enhance 
patients’ autonomy, heightened informed-consent requirements aim—in many cases, 
overtly—to guide patients toward continuing with their pregnancies. See Maya Manian, The 
Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL’Y 223, 250 (2009). But given that this is the terrain on which battles over abortion are 
being fought, it is useful to think through the effects of these laws within that framework. And 
this Article’s close examination of such laws reveals their previously unnoticed horizontal 
threat to abortion rights. 
 51. 505 U.S. 833. 
 52. Id. at 882 (plurality opinion). 
 53. Id. 
2016] ABORTION AND REGULATORY SPILLOVER  11 
 
“truthful, nonmisleading information” about those risks,54 even when motivated by 
a preference for childbirth over abortion.55 This authorization is controversial 
because it allows the government to supersede doctors in producing and 
promulgating medical information.56 Yet at present it is part and parcel of our 
constitutional law.57 
Thus far, fourteen states have read Casey to sanction heightened informed-
consent requirements for abortion.58 Those states are Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.59 Though the terms of the statutes to 
some extent vary, in each state doctors must inform women about the risk of post-
abortion depression.60 Failure to do so will vitiate the patient’s consent to the abortion 
procedure and expose the doctor to tort liability, as well as disciplinary and some-
times criminal penalties.61 The bellwether of this trend was South Dakota—a state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 883. In giving this authorization, the Court overruled parts of its decisions in 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (invali-
dating “abortion regulations designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between 
abortion or childbirth”), and Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (rejecting “[Pennsylvania’s] outright attempt to 
wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-
consent dialogue between the woman and her physician”). Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
 56. See Steven E. Weinberger, Hal C. Lawrence III, Douglas E. Henley, Errol R. Alden 
& David B. Hoyt, Legislative Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, 367 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1557 (2012).  
 57. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007) (“The State has an interest in 
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to 
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound 
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know . . . .”). But see supra note 
18 (suggesting that the Court’s recent opinion in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 
15-274 (U.S. June 27, 2016) may reopen the constitutional debate).  
 58. See infra note 148 and accompanying text and Table 1. 
 59. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(a)(3), -6710(a) (Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1061.15 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2015); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.4242, .4243(a)(2) (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2), (3) 
(West Supp. 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-104(5), -304 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 44-2816, 28-327.01(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.13, .82(1)(b) 
(West Supp. 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(e), -1.7 (2011 & Supp. 2015); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012(a)(1)(B), 171.014 (Supp. 2015); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-7-305.5(2)(a), (o) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(F)(3) 
(2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2I-3(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253.10(1)(b)3, (3)(c)1.f (West Supp. 2015); see also, e.g., TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A 
WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 16 (2003); Abortion Risks, LA. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HOSPS., 
http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/1063/n/275 [https://perma.cc/7ACL-UXCA] 
(informing women that abortion might cause “depression, grief, anxiety, lowered self-esteem, 
regret, attachment, flashbacks, and substance abuse”). 
 60. See infra note 148 and accompanying text and Table 1. 
 61. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1.7 (2011) (reaffirming the South Dakota 
common-law cause of action for medical malpractice informed-consent claims available 
against doctors who fail to warn patients about postabortion depression); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. 
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that since 2005 has statutorily required doctors to warn women not only about the 
general risk of postabortion depression, but also about the fact that abortion may lead 
to ideation of suicide and to actual suicide.62 
In the pages ahead, we focus on statutes mandating that doctors warn patients 
about the risk of postabortion depression. With one exception,63 these mandates are 
not expressly qualified by Casey’s “medically accurate” proviso. Doctors conse-
quently appear to have no choice but to tell every patient that she may develop de-
pression following an abortion. Under the statutory mandates of South Dakota,64 
Louisiana,65 Michigan,66 and Wisconsin,67 doctors must also warn patients that post-
abortion depression may have serious consequences that may include feelings of 
guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, anger, psychological trauma, 
and suicidal thoughts.68  
Unlike the breast-cancer warnings mandated in some states,69 warnings about 
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 34-23A-10.2 (2011) (categorizing violation of South Dakota’s disclosure obligations for 
doctors as a Class 2 misdemeanor reportable to the Board of Medical Examiners). 
 62. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011). A number of states also require 
women seeking abortions to undergo an ultrasound examination that displays the fetus’s image 
and heartbeat. See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path 
to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 351, 393–96 (2008) (arguing that such laws are 
morally reprehensible in that they coercively use a woman’s body as a source of information); 
see also Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North Carolina’s 
mandatory ultrasound law as going well beyond the means “states have customarily employed 
to effectuate their undeniable interests in ensuring informed consent and in protecting the sanc-
tity of life”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015). In addition, the states of Alaska, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, and Texas require doctors to highlight the connection be-
tween abortion and breast cancer and notify women about that connection when it is “medi-
cally accurate.” See supra note 21.  
 63. North Carolina is the exception. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.82(1)(b) (West Supp. 
2014) (requiring a doctor to inform a woman seeking an abortion, “when medically accurate,” 
about “any adverse psychological effects”). 
 64. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011). 
 65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1061.16, :1061.17, :1157.1, :1157.2 (2016). 
 66. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2015). 
 67. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(1)(b)3, (3)(c)1(f) (West Supp. 2015). 
 68. Texas’s administrative materials (the information booklet distributed by the 
Department of Health pursuant to section 171.014 of the Texas Health and Safety Code) also 
inform women that “[s]ome women have reported serious psychological effects after their 
abortion, including depression, grief, anxiety, lowered self-esteem, regret, suicidal thoughts 
and behavior, sexual dysfunction, avoidance of emotional attachment, flashbacks, and sub-
stance abuse.” TEX. DEP’T HEALTH, supra note 59, at 16. 
 69. See supra notes 21, 62. For literature disclaiming any link between abortion and breast 
cancer, see COMM. ON GYNECOLOGIC PRACTICE, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND 
GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 434, INDUCED ABORTION AND BREAST CANCER 
RISK (2009) (refuting unequivocally the connection between abortion and breast cancer risk 
and asserting there is “no causal relationship between induced abortion and a subsequent in-
crease in breast cancer risk”); Katherine DeLellis Henderson, Jane Sullivan-Halley, Peggy 
Reynolds, Pamela L. Horn-Ross, Christina A. Clarke, Ellen T. Chang, Susan Neuhausen, 
Giske Ursin & Leslie Bernstein, Incomplete Pregnancy Is Not Associated with Breast Cancer 
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postabortion depression are not empirically preposterous. Abortion can be an emo-
tionally taxing event,70 though it often brings about feelings of relief in the end.71 
Although the experience does not independently drive women into full-blown de-
pression,72 it may still contribute to depression by aggravating preexisting mental or 
                                                                                                                 
 
Risk: The California Teachers Study, 77 CONTRACEPTION 391, 396 (2008) (“[O]ur results pro-
vide . . . strong evidence that neither induced abortion nor miscarriage is associated with breast 
cancer risk and may help to resolve any remaining uncertainty as to whether such a relationship 
exists.”); Gillian K. Reeves, et al., Breast Cancer Risk in Relation to Abortion: Results from 
the EPIC Study, 119 INT’L J. CANCER 1741, 1744 (2006) (“[T]he findings presented here pro-
vide further unbiased evidence for the lack of an adverse effect of induced abortion on breast 
cancer risk.”). 
 70. Nancy E. Adler, Henry P. David, Brenda N. Major, Susan H. Roth, Nancy Felipe 
Russo & Gail E. Wyatt, Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
1194, 1197 (1992) (“[A]n unwanted pregnancy is . . . an event that can be challenging or 
stressful. . . . Termination of an unwanted pregnancy may reduce the stress . . . . At the same 
time, the abortion itself may be experienced as stressful.”). 
 71. Id. at 1198 (“When women are asked to indicate which emotions they experience 
following first-trimester abortion, the most frequent response is to report feelings of relief and 
happiness . . . .”); David A. Grimes & Mitchell D. Creinin, Induced Abortion: An Overview 
for Internists, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 620, 624 (2004) (“Induced abortion does not harm 
women’s emotional health; for most women, it allows an overall improvement in quality of 
life. Indeed, the most common reaction to abortion is a profound sense of relief.” (endnotes 
omitted)).  
 72. Rather, well-designed studies and meta-analyses of the extensive research in the area 
refute the claim that abortion causes psychological harm. APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL 
HEALTH AND ABORTION, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND 
ABORTION, 5–6 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QYG8-NFTH] (“The best scientific evidence published indicates that among 
adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is 
no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver that preg-
nancy.” (emphasis in original)); NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, ACAD. OF 
MED. ROYAL COLLS., INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL HEALTH: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF 
THE MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES OF INDUCED ABORTION, INCLUDING THEIR PREVALENCE AND 
ASSOCIATED FACTORS 8 (2011), www.aomrc.org.uk/doc_view/9432-induced-abortion-and 
-mental-health [https://perma.cc/L528-956Z] (finding, based on extensive review of existing 
studies, that “rates of mental health problems for women with an unwanted pregnancy were 
the same whether they had an abortion or gave birth”); Adler et al., supra note 70, at 1198 
(“[T]he weight of the evidence is that legal abortion as a resolution to an unwanted pregnancy, 
particularly in the first trimester, does not create psychological hazards for most women under-
going the procedure.”); Vignetta E. Charles, Chelsea B. Polis, Srinivas K. Sridhara & Robert 
W. Blum, Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the 
Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 448–49 (2008) (finding that the best studies—well de-
signed and well executed—“suggest[ed] few, if any, differences between aborters and their 
respective comparison groups in terms of mental health sequelae”); Brenda Major, Caroline 
Richards, M. Lynne Cooper, Catherine Cozzarelli & Josephine Zubek, Personal Resilience, 
Cognitive Appraisals, and Coping: An Integrative Model of Adjustment to Abortion, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 741 (1998) (“Overall, our sample of women did not re-
port high levels of psychological distress 1 month following their abortions . . . .”); Brenda 
Major, Commentary, Psychological Implications of Abortion—Highly Charged and Rife with 
Misleading Research, 168 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1257, 1258 (2003) (“[Well-designed 
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emotional conditions.73 The probability of this scenario is not high, but it is not neg-
ligible either.74 This probability therefore cannot be written off completely. 
                                                                                                                 
 
studies establish] that the emotional well-being of women who abort an unplanned pregnancy 
does not differ from that of women who carry a pregnancy to term.”); Munk-Olsen et al., supra 
note 44, at 334–36 (reporting increase in psychiatric treatment after childbirth, but not abor-
tion); Gail Erlick Robinson, Nada L. Stotland, Nancy Felipe Russo, Joan A. Lang & Mallay 
Occhiogrosso, Is There an “Abortion Trauma Syndrome”? Critiquing the Evidence, 17 HARV. 
REV. PSYCHIATRY 268, 276 (2009) (“[P]ublished studies concluding that abortion causes psy-
chiatric illness have numerous methodological problems; since their conclusions are question-
able, they should not be used as a basis for public policy.”); Steinberg et al., supra note 44, at 
196 (finding no psychiatric differences between women who aborted versus delivered); Nada 
Stotland, The Myth of Abortion Trauma Syndrome: Update, 2007, 42 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 28, 
28 (2007) (“[A] growing body of empirical research has demonstrated that abortion does not 
cause psychiatric illness.”); Carolyn Westhoff, Lucy Picardo & Ellen Morrow, Quality of Life 
Following Early Medical or Surgical Abortion, 67 CONTRACEPTION 41, 41 (2003) (“[Results 
of original study] provide substantial reassurance that women undergoing abortion experience 
a marked improvement in their quality of life after the abortion.”); see also Siegel, supra note 
16, at 1719 n.81 (canvassing empirical literature). Two important recent contributions analyze 
results from a longitudinal “turn-away study,” which compares women who presented at par-
ticular clinics and received abortions to women who presented at the same facilities but were 
denied abortions because they were just over the applicable state-law gestational limits. D.G. 
Foster, J.R. Steinberg, S.C.M. Roberts, J. Neuhaus & M.A. Biggs, A Comparison of 
Depression and Anxiety Symptom Trajectories Between Women Who Had an Abortion and 
Women Denied One, 45 PSYCHOL. MED. 2073, 2073 (2015) (“Women who received an abor-
tion had similar or lower levels of depression and anxiety than women denied an abortion.”); 
Corinne H. Rocca, Katrina Kimport, Sarah C.M. Roberts, Heather Gould, John Neuhaus & 
Diana G. Foster, Decision Rightness and Emotional Responses to Abortion in the United 
States: A Longitudinal Study, PLOS ONE, July 8, 2015, at 1, 10, http://journals.plos.org 
/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0128832 [https://perma.cc/2FBR-3YK4] (assessing 
women’s emotional reactions to abortion and finding that “at all time points over three years, 
95% of participants reported abortion was the right decision”). 
 73. See Robinson et al., supra note 72, at 268 (“The most consistent predictor of mental 
disorders after abortion remains preexisting disorders . . . .”); Lisa Rubin & Nancy Felipe 
Russo, Abortion and Mental Health: What Therapists Need To Know, in FROM MENARCHE TO 
MENOPAUSE: THE FEMALE BODY IN FEMINIST THERAPY 69, 74 (Joan C. Chrisler ed., 2004) 
(“Researchers have identified a number of predictors of women’s mental health after abortion. 
The most important is a woman’s previous mental health.” (emphasis in original)); see also 
Julia H. Littell & James C. Coyne, Correspondence, Abortion and Mental Health: Guidelines 
for Proper Scientific Conduct Ignored, 200 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 75, 75–76 (2012) (identifying 
eleven methodological flaws in a statistical study that claimed to have found significant cor-
relation between abortion and mental health problems). 
 74. See, e.g., David M. Fergusson, L. John Horwood & Elizabeth M. Ridder, Abortion in 
Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16, 23 
(2006) (study identifying depression and suicidal tendencies in young women who underwent 
abortion, while acknowledging inability to control for wantedness of the pregnancy and con-
cluding that “the issue of whether or not abortion has harmful effects on mental health remains 
to be fully resolved”); Brenda Major, Catherine Cozzarelli, M. Lynne Cooper, Josephine 
Zubek, Caroline Richards, Michael Wilhite & Richard H. Gramzow, Psychological Responses 
of Women After First-Trimester Abortion, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 777, 777 (2000) 
(reporting that a small percentage of women, especially those with prior history of depression, 
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Whether the prospect of postabortion depression is significant enough to be in-
cluded in doctors’ disclosure obligations to patients, however, is an altogether sepa-
rate question. Every medical procedure involves risks. The multitude and variety of 
those risks make it impossible for doctors to give their patients complete information 
about every risk of harm. Moreover, even if doctors were to give patients full infor-
mation, the information’s complexity would make it impossible for the patients to 
properly evaluate its significance.75 Some risks associated with a patient’s treatment 
must therefore remain undisclosed.  
Separating those remote risks from the information that doctors must disclose to 
their patients is not easy. This choice depends on how the policy maker values indi-
vidual autonomy relative to efficiency.76 Policy makers who place more value on 
autonomy demand that doctors disclose to patients as much information as possible. 
Such disclosure, so goes the argument, makes a patient better informed about avail-
able treatments, which enables her to choose the treatment she really wants. Policy 
makers who prefer efficiency over autonomy allow the medical profession to select 
the information that patients should receive. Arguably, this selective disclosure 
streamlines the provision of medical care while still allowing the patient to choose 
the treatment that fits her needs. 
These conflicting viewpoints are reflected in the split between states that base 
their informed-consent requirements on doctors’ customs and jurisdictions that ex-
tract those requirements from patients’ expectations. Thirty states base doctors’ 
informed-consent obligations—in general or specifically with respect to abortion 
—on customs and practices of the medical profession.77 This approach standardizes 
informed-consent obligations and makes them easy to comply with, which gives doc-
tors more time to actually treat patients. By adopting the “doctors’ custom” standard, 
states therefore value efficiency in the provision of medical care over patients’ 
autonomy. The other twenty states and the District of Columbia require doctors’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
experience post-traumatic stress disorder and psychological problems postabortion); see also 
Priscilla K. Coleman, Catherine T. Coyle, Martha Shuping & Vincent M. Rue, Induced 
Abortion and Anxiety, Mood, and Substance Abuse Disorders: Isolating the Effects of Abortion 
in the National Comorbidity Survey, 43 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 770 (2009); Willy Pedersen, 
Abortion and Depression: A Population-Based Longitudinal Study of Young Women, 36 
SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 424, 424 (2008) (finding increased rates of depression for 
Norwegian women in their twenties who undergo abortions). But see Robinson et al., supra 
note 72, at 275 (“[I]n order to get an abortion in New Zealand, one must prove to two specialist 
consultants that the pregnancy would seriously harm the life, physical, or mental health of the 
woman, that the woman is severely mentally handicapped, or that the pregnancy was the result 
of rape or incest. These conditions suggest an inclusion bias [in Fergusson’s work] toward 
vulnerable, high-risk women in the abortion group.”); infra note 108 (noting extensive criti-
cism of Coleman). 
 75. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 107–18 (2014) (explaining how overflow 
of information distorts decisions). 
 76. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 
(1994) (describing informed-consent doctrine as a tension between patients’ autonomy right 
and doctors’ interest in self-regulation).  
 77. See infra notes 148–50 and Table 1. 
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provision of information to patients to satisfy a “reasonable patient’s” expectation.78 
This requirement expands doctors’ disclosure obligations beyond the information 
that the medical profession deems material.  
The two standards overlap along two important dimensions. First, doctors’ cus-
toms integrate the legal requirement that it is the patient who must ultimately decide 
whether to undergo a particular procedure, with the doctor helping the patient choose 
wisely.79 Second, and equally important, because the “patient expectation” standard 
honors only reasonable expectations, doctors have no obligation to reveal infor-
mation that their profession considers wholly irrelevant or, worse, detrimental to the 
patient’s treatment.80 Doctors’ customs thus shape patients’ expectations and are af-
fected by them at the same time.81 
This dialectic brings the “doctors’ custom” and “patient expectation” standards 
close to each other. Both standards require doctors to inform patients about the na-
ture, risks, and benefits of the recommended procedure and its medically approved 
alternatives.82 The differences between the two standards relate to peripheral infor-
mation, including doctors’ performance records, medically inferior procedures, and 
remote risks. Under the “patient expectation” standard, physicians may be obligated 
to inform patients about their past performance and rate of success in carrying out 
the procedure in question.83 The “doctors’ custom” standard, on the other hand, does 
not recognize this far-reaching disclosure obligation.84 The “patient expectation” 
standard also sometimes requires doctors to tell patients about procedures doctors 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. See infra notes 148–50 and Table 1. 
 79. Schuck, supra note 76, at 924 (“The most fundamental normative argument in favor 
of requiring health care providers to obtain patients’ informed consent to medical treatments 
proceeds from the principle of autonomy—the notion that each mature individual has a right 
to make the basic choices that affect her life prospects.”); id. at 916 (“Physicians may not deal 
with their patients at arm’s length; they owe their patients a fiduciary duty, which includes an 
obligation to act exclusively in the patient’s interests and to disclose all information material 
to those interests.”). 
 80. But the patient can ask questions that must be answered truthfully. See, e.g., IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 147.137(2) (West 2014) (entitling patients to ask doctors questions and receive 
satisfactory answers); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 601.4 (2015) (same). 
 81. For that reason, we separate the two approaches by their three functional differences 
as specified below. 
 82. See Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 
1232 & n.166 (2012) (summarizing the informed-consent requirement and citing relevant 
authorities). 
 83. Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 717 (Md. 2006) (holding that a surgeon’s in-
experience presents a jury issue of whether informed consent was given); Johnson ex rel Adler 
v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 505–06 (Wis. 1996) (requiring doctors to reveal their past 
records). For analysis of this rule, see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second 
Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(1999).  
 84. See, e.g., Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“[D]efend-
ants, as a matter of law, did not have a duty to disclose Dr. Cohn’s statistical history of trans-
plant failures to obtain the decedent’s informed consent.”); cf. Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 
20–22 (Conn. 2006) (holding that Connecticut’s so-called “patient expectation” standard does 
not require doctors to disclose prior experience with procedures). 
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consider inferior or of which they disapprove.85 Examples of such procedures include 
vaginal breech delivery as a substitute for a broadly recommended C-section86 and a 
risky bone surgery instead of bed rest.87 The “doctors’ custom” standard exempts 
doctors from the duty to notify patients about such inferior treatment options.88 
The “doctors’ custom” standard also relieves doctors of the obligation to inform 
patients about remote risks of harm.89 For example, an orthopedic surgeon does not 
have to tell a patient contemplating spinal cord surgery that one in one thousand 
patients undergoing a similar surgery becomes paralyzed after falling on the floor 
from his bed.90 Courts applying the “patient expectation” standard see things differ-
ently. In the oft-cited “patient expectation” precedent Canterbury v. Spence,91 the 
court ruled that doctors must inform patients about small chances of death or severe 
incapacitation.92 The gravity of the potential harm makes such disclosure mandatory 
even where the chances are quite remote.93 Based on this understanding of the law, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 460–64 (N.J. 1999) (holding that 
“patient expectation” standard authorizes jurors to hold doctors liable for failure to disclose 
nonrecommended medical alternatives). 
 86. See, e.g., William M. Gilbert, Shauna M. Hicks, Nina M. Boe & Beate Danielsen, 
Vaginal Versus Cesarean Delivery for Breech Presentation in California: A Population-Based 
Study, 102 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 911, 911 (2003) (demonstrating empirically that 
normal-term breech fetuses have significantly increased neonatal mortality and morbidity 
when delivered vaginally relative to a C-section). 
 87. Matthies, 733 A.2d at 458–60.  
 88. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 2d 18, 34 (D. Me. 2010) (“Because 
modern medicine no longer recognizes as reasonable the surgical resection of a colon tumor 
for someone in [the patient’s] condition, explaining this alternative [to the patient was not 
required under Maine’s “doctors’ custom” standard].”); Taylor v. County of Cook, 957 N.E.2d 
413, 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding under Illinois’s “doctors’ custom” standard that the 
court below “did not err in stating what [the patient] would or would not have done had she 
received information about alternative treatments was irrelevant since the standard to base the 
treatment decision upon is an objective and not a subjective standard”). 
 89. See, e.g., Bronneke v. Rutherford, 89 P.3d 40, 46 (Nev. 2004) (holding under “doc-
tors’ custom” standard that reasonable chiropractor need not inform patient about risk of stroke 
that amounts to one in 5,850,000); see also BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA 
H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 217–18 (7th ed. 2013) (attesting that doctors’ custom standard 
does not obligate doctors to tell patients about remote risks). 
 90. This example draws on Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a case 
decided under the “patient expectation” standard. 
 91. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 92. Id. at 788 (“A very small chance of death or serious disablement may well be signifi-
cant . . . .”); see also, e.g., Martin ex rel Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Wis. 1995) 
(attesting that “courts have . . . been quick to recognize that although the risk of a complication 
may be small, such risk may be significant to a patient’s decision in light of the potentially 
severe consequences” (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788)). 
 93. See, e.g., Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming 
Canterbury’s requirement that a patient be informed about “a one percent chance of very se-
rious consequential harm”); McKinney v. Nash, 174 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (hold-
ing that, prima facie, doctors must inform patients about a one in 1000 risk of testicular atrophy 
due to vascular damage caused by hernia repair operation); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 
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the Canterbury court concluded that the surgeon in our above-mentioned example 
had violated the patient’s right to informed consent.94 
Doctors’ duty to inform patients about improbable but serious harms marks the 
baseline for assessing the effects of mandatory warnings about postabortion depres-
sion. Depression resulting from abortion is a low-probability event in and of itself. 
Cases in which abortion renders a woman deeply depressed or suicidal have an even 
lower probability. But proponents of postabortion depression warnings do not see 
this as a problem. They believe that these warnings are socially desirable as a means 
of dissuading women from choosing abortion. This justification, however, has a con-
stitutional limit: information that doctors communicate to patients cannot be mis-
leading. Misinforming a woman about the abortion’s consequences in order to con-
vince her to keep an unwanted pregnancy is quite clearly unconstitutional under 
Casey.95  
For that reason, many proponents of postabortion depression warnings have aban-
doned arguments that are transparently motivated by antiabortion paternalism and 
instead have begun appealing to women’s individual autonomy. These proponents 
argue that warnings are warnings: all they do is give women more information about 
abortion as part of their “right to know.”96 This information enhances a woman’s 
choice and control over her destiny. After receiving this information, some women 
may feel uncomfortable about the depression prospect, even when its probability is 
low. They may want to eliminate this prospect completely by calling the abortion off. 
Other women may decide not to worry about serious but low-probability scenarios 
and go ahead with the abortion procedure. Arguably, therefore, warnings about post-
abortion depression have only an upside and no downside. By giving women more 
information, they enhance women’s autonomy without restricting access to abortion. 
This argument has some intuitive appeal. Part of its appeal lies in the fact that 
                                                                                                                 
 
553 So. 2d 398, 403 (La. 1988) (“Canterbury notes that there is no bright line separating a 
significant from an insignificant risk. Disclosure has been required when there was a three 
percent chance of death, paralysis or other injury, and when there was a one percent chance of 
loss of hearing. Nondisclosure has been justified when there was a 1.5% chance of loss of an 
eye and a one in 100,000 chance of death.” (citing, respectively, Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 
2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), 
aff’d, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); Yeates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982 (Kan. 1964); and Pauscher 
v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987)) (footnotes omitted)); Long v. 
Jaszczak, 688 N.W.2d 173, 179–80 (N.D. 2004) (holding that an undisclosed one in 40,000 to 
one in 150,000 risk of allergic reaction and death from intravenous pyelogram makes a triable 
issue of informed-consent violation); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 
479, 496 n.41 (Cal. 1990) (“One cannot know with certainty whether a consent is valid until a 
lawsuit has been filed and resolved.”); Jon F. Merz, An Empirical Analysis of the Medical 
Informed Consent Doctrine: Search for a “Standard” of Disclosure, 2 RISK 27, 42 (1991) 
(“[N]o physician can absolutely avoid liability under the informed consent laws unless he or 
she discloses every known risk . . . .”). 
 94. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786–88. 
 95. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992). 
 96. See Siegel, supra note 16, at 1706 (observing that “advocates of incremental and abso-
lute abortion restrictions have increasingly come to justify such regulation in the frames of 
their opponents, and now often portray abortion restrictions as promoting women’s informed 
consent, women’s health, women’s welfare, and women’s freedom”). 
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mandatory warnings about postabortion depression conform with the “patient expec-
tation” standard, which in many states applies to all patients, whatever the procedure, 
and not just to women considering abortion. Accordingly, it might appear that the 
depression warnings do not single out pregnant women as requiring special paternal-
istic protection.97 Indeed, the emergence of the “patient expectation” standard itself 
represented courts’ rejection of the paternalism with which doctors treated patients 
under the “doctors’ custom” standard for informed consent.98 
This argument is predicated on the assumption that a person’s autonomy increases 
with the addition of all new information. In the next section, we show that this as-
sumption is not necessarily true and argue against its introduction into our rules of 
informed consent.  
B. The Right Not To Know  
A person is best positioned to make an important decision when she has full in-
formation concerning that decision. From this simple truth people often derive a re-
lated, and yet altogether different—as well as fundamentally flawed—proposition 
about the value of information. They tend to believe that accumulation of information 
related to a person’s decision invariably makes the person better informed and brings 
her closer to the truth.99 This belief is flawed for a simple reason: not all information 
is trustworthy. Some information might lead a person astray.  
An individual with full knowledge of the facts need not filter information for qual-
ity. For a person with no such omniscience, however, identifying information as re-
liable and unreliable is an absolute must in order to determine what information to 
heed and what to ignore. Scarcity of time and resources and limits of cognition make 
this informational strategy rational and, indeed, necessary for any person.100 As a 
general matter, a rational person will do well to ignore risks that are abstract and 
remote.101 
Mandatory warnings about postabortion depression are a case in point. When a 
doctor informs a woman that abortion might cause depression in some cases, the 
woman might reasonably want to know about the circumstances of those cases in 
order to compare those cases with hers. Acquiring that information, however, may 
not provide much assistance. Consider a doctor who tells the woman that those rare 
cases involved women with prior psychological or psychiatric problems. This piece 
of information obscures more than it illuminates. First, psychological and psychiatric 
problems are not created equal and do not affect people in the same way. Second, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. But see id. at 1773–80 (unveiling gender paternalism in antiabortion movement’s al-
lusions to women’s autonomy). 
 98. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 (associating “patient’s expectation” standard with 
patient’s freedom to decide for herself). 
 99. Remarkably, Jeremy Bentham relied on this belief in his proposal to abolish all tech-
nical rules of evidence. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 122–33 (2005) (dis-
cussing Bentham’s evidence theory and exposing its flaws). 
 100. See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 429–34 (2014) (explaining 
how evidence law eliminates inefficient information). 
 101. See id. at 435–39 (developing signal-to-noise criterion for selecting evidence for 
trials). 
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some of these problems may have been serious enough to cause the depression by 
themselves, thus rendering the abortion causally immaterial. Third and equally im-
portantly, psychological and psychiatric problems may also trigger postpartum de-
pression in a woman who delivers a completely healthy baby.102 These scenarios are 
remote, unspecified, and unforeseeable. Factoring them into a specific decision about 
abortion can only create an impasse.  
We therefore believe that the informed-consent doctrine should exempt doctors 
from the obligation to inform all patients about remote risks of harm associated with 
the recommended treatment—and in particular, the remote risk of depression without 
reference to a woman’s individual circumstances. Notifying a patient about such 
risks does not enhance her autonomy. In fact, it makes the patient less informed and, 
consequently, less autonomous. This is because the information she receives is se-
lective and misleading: it only reveals the remote risks faced by patients who undergo 
the recommended treatment. It does not tell the patient about other remote risks, in-
cluding those she would face if she did not receive the treatment. 
Consider again the seminal case Canterbury v. Spence.103 Assume, counterfactu-
ally, that the doctor does tell the patient that in approximately one case out of one 
thousand a person undergoing an identical spinal cord surgery becomes paralyzed 
after falling from his bed.104 Would that information help the patient make the right 
decision? We do not think so. Consider the risks faced by a person who requires 
surgery to fix his back problems but avoids doing it. First, the person’s problems may 
aggravate over time into a condition that might severely impair his functioning and 
perhaps lead to paralysis.105 Second, the person might get involved in a car accident, 
a fight, or a fall that will inflict critical trauma on his untreated back. The combined 
probability of these scenarios may well be greater than one in one thousand. 
If so, the court in Canterbury should not have stopped at asking doctors to inform 
patients about the “surgery, fall, and paralysis” scenario. The court should have also 
required that doctors tell patients about equally morbid and equally improbable 
scenarios that involve people with untreated back problems. If a patient should know 
about one improbable possibility in order to make an autonomous choice of 
treatment, then she should also be apprised of all other potential outcomes that fall 
within the same realm of possibility. The informed-consent doctrine cannot ratio-
nally require doctors to notify patients about just one specific low-probability risk 
among many. 
A much better alternative would be to exclude all remote scenarios (regardless of 
the magnitude of the harm) and focus solely on those scenarios that are likely enough 
to materialize in the patient’s case. These causally significant scenarios can only be 
identified by the medical profession, which analyzes and utilizes the collective ex-
perience of doctors.  
That said, the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey gave states the power to select 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Stacey A. Tovino, Scientific Understandings of Postpartum Illness: Improving Health 
Law and Policy?, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 121–22 (2010) (summarizing current multi-
factorial explanations for postpartum depression).  
 103. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 104. Id. at 776 (describing patient’s falling accident). 
 105. See John W. McDonald & Cristina Sadowsky, Spinal-Cord Injury, 359 LANCET 417, 
417 (2002) (listing morbid consequences of untreated spinal cord injuries).  
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the risks about which doctors should notify patients within their borders.106 The Court 
also held that in exercising that power, states are entitled to implement their prefer-
ence for childbirth over abortion.107 For that reason, supporters of mandatory warn-
ings about postabortion depression can claim that our critique of these warnings is 
beside the point. Specifically, they can argue that postabortion and postpartum de-
pression, while both unfortunate, are not equal in the eyes of South Dakota and like-
minded states. For these states, postpartum depression accompanies the birth of a 
living human being—and is therefore a much happier end. These states therefore can 
require doctors to tell women about postabortion depression, while leaving the dis-
cussion of the postpartum depression risk to doctors’ discretion. There is nothing 
inconsistent, illogical, or probabilistically irrational in that choice. 
Even with the Supreme Court’s approval of this general approach, some of the 
states’ laws sit uneasily with108 the Court’s admonition that such information be 
“truthful and not misleading.”109 But rather than assess the constitutionality of these 
laws under Casey’s proviso, we focus on a different strain of the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence: the premise that the regulation of informed consent is an 
intrastate affair. We submit that this premise is mistaken in that it ignores the South 
Dakota effect, to which we now turn. 
II. THE SOUTH DAKOTA EFFECT 
In this part of the Article, we demonstrate that the postabortion depression warn-
ings mandated by South Dakota and like-minded states threaten to spread to other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (plurality opinion).  
 107. Id.  
 108. This transgression is particularly blatant in the state at the center of this piece, South 
Dakota, whose statute, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011), requires doctors 
to warn patients that the abortion might lead to suicide ideation and suicide. But see Planned 
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894–95 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(upholding the constitutionality of South Dakota’s suicide warning as truthful and not mis-
leading). The Eighth Circuit based its conclusion upon studies carried out by Mika Gissler et 
al., David Fergusson et al., and the state’s expert witness, Dr. Priscilla Coleman. Coleman, et 
al., supra note 74; Fergusson et al., supra note 74; Mika Gissler, Elina Hemminski & Jouko 
Lonnqvist, Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987–94: Register Linkage Study, 313 BRIT. 
MED. J. 1431, 1432 (1996). The Rounds decision, however, paid no attention (1) to the fierce 
and widespread critique of Coleman’s studies, see, e.g., Robinson et al., supra note 73; (2) to 
Fergusson’s caveat about his research group’s inability to control for wantedness of the 
aborted pregnancies and his own unwillingness to draw firm conclusions from the study; and 
(3) to the failure of Gissler et al. to distinguish between wanted and unwanted pregnancies in 
a Scandinavian country where use of contraception is a norm, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
ABORTION AND WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE RIGHTS 2 (2009). Furthermore, 
Gissler’s study expressly connected women’s suicides to preexisting conditions that included 
“low social class, low social support, and previous life events.” Gissler et al., supra, at 1434; 
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(F)(3) (2014); cf. Haupt, supra note 49, at 1297 (developing 
theory extending constitutional free-speech protection to professions as “knowledge commu-
nit[ies]” and criticizing Rounds for failure to protect doctors against state-imposed duty to tell 
patients that abortion might lead to suicide). 
 109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
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states. This regulatory spillover challenges the conventional assumption that state 
laws of informed consent have no effect on other states. As we will show, although 
statutes requiring doctors to warn women about postabortion depression are confined 
to the borders of the states that enacted them, the change they effect within their 
states could infiltrate the informed-consent requirements of other states.  
A. Regulatory Spillover 
Regulatory spillovers come in a variety of different forms and raise a number of 
distinct concerns. An important recent contribution to the literature, by Professor 
Heather Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt, describes (though it does not endorse) the con-
ventional wisdom regarding interstate spillovers this way: “[S]tate-generated 
spillovers cause interstate friction, generate inefficiencies, undermine the national 
marketplace, violate the autonomy of other states, and threaten democracy by pre-
venting citizens of the affected state from choosing their own destinies.”110 This de-
scription captures many of the harms—economic and political—that a single state’s 
activity can inflict upon other states. Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine 
Sharkey offer another definition, one that focuses on cost-shifting and the protection 
of in-state economic interests: “By ‘spillover effects’ we simply mean state law that, 
by its operation, shifts costs and favors its own citizens while disproportionately af-
fecting out-of-state interests, or, as the economists would have it, imposes externali-
ties on others.”111 Professor Gillian Metzger emphasizes constitutionally grounded 
notions of state sovereignty and autonomy in identifying the concerns raised by 
spillovers, observing that “state autonomy . . . embod[ies] the idea that each state is 
free to pursue the policies it believes best, . . . free from unwanted interference by its 
sister states.”112  
These and other scholarly works113 tend to emphasize intentionality and self-
interest, analogizing state actions to those of self-seeking individuals. Specifically, 
they posit that state policies are often deliberately designed to shift economic and 
political costs across state lines while retaining benefits in-state.114  
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 62. 
 111. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1371 (2006); see also Cameron O’Brien Flynn & Robin Fretwell Wilson, When 
States Regulate Emergency Contraceptives Like Abortion, What Should Guide Disclosure?, 
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72, 77, 82 (2015) (identifying expansion of abortion regulation to 
emergency contraceptives as “regulatory spillover”). But see Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry 
E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 660 (2013) 
(acknowledging that “[s]pillover problems from extraterritorial regulation can take several 
forms”). 
 112. Metzger, supra note 45, at 1513. 
 113. See, e.g., Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An 
Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal 
Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 289, 329 (2003) (“[S]tates should not be able to externalize 
costs and internalize benefits, giving benefits to itself or its citizens, but placing part of the 
cost on other states or their citizens.”); Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition 
in the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617, 617 (1992) (“When states can pass laws 
whose costs are borne by outsiders, self-interested behavior by each makes all worse off.”). 
 114. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 70.  
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We use the concept of “spillover” more expansively. On our account, regulatory 
spillovers encompass any extraterritorial effects of state laws, whether intentional or 
unintentional, without reference to purpose or (necessarily) to economic effects. 
Moreover, spillovers, as we describe them here, need not provide any benefit to—or 
even have any impact upon—the citizens of the state whose regulation migrates to 
another state.115 And our focus on the impact of such migrations is less on states qua 
states than on citizens of states (primarily, in this instance, on women seeking abor-
tions and physicians who perform abortions).  
Our account also differs from the existing writings on regulatory spillovers in 
terms of both the spillover’s domain and the mechanism through which the spillover 
occurs. The South Dakota effect does not operate by affecting manufacturers and 
products in a national market, like the California effect.116 Nor does it trigger an in-
crease in the movement of particular items—marijuana,117 say, or firearms118—from 
states with laxer regulations to states with more stringent regulations. Rather, its im-
pact is primarily on doctrine and practice.119 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 115 (2009) (“The social and moral policies of one state may have 
an impact on people all over the United States. . . . [Among other things,] [t]he abortion poli-
cies . . . of neighboring states may have an impact on the social fabric of a particular state.”); 
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: 
Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 1203, 1281 (1997) (proposing refinement to antitrust state-action doctrine “to ensure 
that state regulations that adversely affect the economic interests of citizens living outside the 
regulating state will be curtailed”); Jason Marisam, The Internationalization of Agency 
Actions, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1917 (2015) (arguing that, in the international context, 
“[r]egulatory spillover effects exist whenever one nation’s regulations substantially affect the 
well-being of another nation’s population”). 
 116. For another illustration of a spillover that results from a single state’s dominance on 
the relevant market, consider the profound influence of Texas’s Board of Education decisions 
on the contents of schoolbooks nationwide. As a market for schoolbooks, Texas is “so big and 
influential that national publishers tended to gear their books toward whatever it wanted,” 
including controversial and scientifically unfounded views about evolution. Gail Collins, How 
Texas Inflicts Bad Textbooks on Us, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 21, 2012), http://www.nybooks 
.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/21/how-texas-inflicts-bad-textbooks-on-us/ [https://perma.cc 
/KY6F-VNWU]. According to schoolbook publishers, “Given the high cost of developing a 
single book, the risk of messing with Texas was high.” Id.; see also Gerken & Holtzblatt, 
supra note 45, at 79.  
 117. See Jack Healy, Nebraska and Oklahoma Sue Colorado Over Marijuana Law, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/nebraska-and 
-oklahoma-sue-colorado-over-marijuana-law.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ87-KAMB]; see also 
Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (mem.) (denying Nebraska and Colorado leave 
to file complaint), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/032116zor_h3ci.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AF3M-BUSE]. 
 118. See Heather Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone Else’s Laws, 
DEMOCRACY, Spring 2015, at 42, 44 (“When Virginia and Georgia maintain lax gun rules, 
firearms flood into New York . . . .”). 
 119. The closest analogue to this type of spillover is a hypothetical spread of mandatory 
consumer warnings that link cellphones to cancer. Such warnings presently exist only in 
Berkeley, California. Carol Pogash, Cellphone Ordinance Puts Berkeley at Forefront of 
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B. Interstate Migration of Postabortion Depression Warnings 
Against this backdrop, the regulatory spillover we identify results from the inter-
play between new information pertaining to medical risk and the states’ rules of in-
formed consent. In this context, “new information” includes any medical infor-
mation, whatever its source, which has not yet been endorsed or definitively rejected 
by the medical community. As we have explained, rules of informed consent vary 
from one state to another: some states base disclosure requirements on doctors’ cus-
toms, while others align those requirements with a reasonable patient’s expecta-
tions.120 The introduction of new information relating to risks affects these standards 
differently.  
The “patient expectation” standard requires doctors to inform patients about every 
factor that might influence a reasonable patient’s selection of treatment, including 
remote risks of serious harm.121 This broad disclosure requirement extends to all 
medical information that might help a patient choose the right treatment, including 
information that comes from out of state.122 Failure to satisfy this requirement 
                                                                                                                 
 
Radiation Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/us 
/cellphone-ordinance-puts-berkeley-at-forefront-of-radiation-debate.html [https://perma.cc 
/5KQQ-KEF2] (reporting that the City of Berkeley “passed a measure—not actually backed 
by science—requiring cellphone stores to warn customers that the products could be hazardous 
to their health, presumably by emitting dangerous levels of cancer-causing radiation”). 
 120. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 121. See sources cited supra note 93.  
 122. For a salient example, see Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 
1984), a case decided under Washington’s “patient expectation” standard. In that case, the 
Ninth Circuit found an informed-consent violation in a doctor’s failure to notify a pregnant 
patient that an anticonvulsant drug, Dilantin, which he prescribed for the patient’s epilepsy, 
had been found to correlate with birth defects by a study that appeared in a reputable medical 
journal in Great Britain, The Lancet. Id. at 519. The court ruled that “the district court did not 
err in finding as a fact that a reasonable patient would have considered these risks in deciding 
on treatment,” id. at 524, and it ended its decision with the following statement of doctrine and 
policy:  
The [British] article pointed out what are at least potentially material risks. It may 
be that those risks had not yet been documented or accepted as a fact in the medi-
cal profession. Nonetheless, under the doctrine of informed consent, those risks 
should have been disclosed. Medical knowledge should not be limited to what is 
generally accepted as a fact by the profession. To hold otherwise would defeat 
the purpose of the doctrine, give little weight to exploratory medical research, 
and invite impossible line drawing. 
Id. at 525; see also Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 870–71 (Miss. 1985) (observing that medi-
cal education and training undergo “nationalization” and that information affecting doctors’ 
standards and practices crosses state boundaries); Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions of 
Authority, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 973 (2009) (“[W]hen the reasonable patient standard 
applies to the informed-consent issue, testimony regarding the breach issue under the mal-
practice and informed-consent counts is likely to come from different sources . . . .”); George 
P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 116 (2004) 
(“Other states choose to apply the . . . prudent patient standard of informed consent, thereby 
requiring a physician to inform his patient of all sources and degrees of information which an 
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exposes the doctor to liability for medical malpractice.123 As a result, new medical 
information, whatever its source,124 updates doctors’ disclosure obligations upon 
introduction.125 
                                                                                                                 
 
average, ordinary, and reasonable patient should and would require in order to make an in-
formed decision regarding the need to submit to a proposed treatment therapy.” (emphasis 
added)); Twerski & Cohen, supra note 83, at 38 (“[A] provider or MCO [managed care or-
ganization] that has risk information in a form from which comparative inferences can be 
drawn—whether the MCO developed that information itself or obtained it from another 
source, such as the government—has the same duty to disclose this information [to the patient] 
as it does to disclose information about risks associated with the procedure.”); cf. Weekly v. 
Solomon, 510 N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that, under Illinois’s “doctors’ 
custom” standard, “the locality rule does not apply to the issue of informed consent” and al-
lowing a physician from Ohio to testify about informed-consent violation by a doctor from 
Illinois). 
 123. See David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, Marin K. Levy, Russell L. Gruen, Edward 
J. Dunn, E. John Orav & Troyen A. Brennan, Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: 
Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 117, 120 
(2007) (finding that doctors practicing in “patient expectation” jurisdictions are more than 
twice as likely to be held liable for informed-consent violations as physicians working in the 
states that follow the “doctors’ custom” standard). 
 124. But compare Spencer v. Seikel, a case in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court dis-
missed the patient’s argument that her doctors “had a duty to inform her that abortion, although 
prohibited in Oklahoma at her stage of pregnancy, was available in other states.” 742 P.2d 
1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987). The court distinguished between the national medical standards 
Oklahoma doctors must use in treating patients, and the abortion laws of states other than 
Oklahoma. Id. In the court’s words, “searching for legal alternatives is a job more suitable for 
lawyers.” Id.; see also Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of 
Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 335 (1999) (“By characterizing abortion 
as legally rather than geographically unavailable, the [Spencer] court absolved the physician 
of the duty to disclose.” (emphasis in original)). The Spencer decision guided the court in a 
California appellate case, Schiff v. Prados, which involved a doctor’s failure to inform the 
patient about a cancer treatment not approved by the FDA and consequently unlawful in 
California, but available in Texas. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 184 (Ct. App. 2001). The court ruled 
in connection with this failure that “even if Texas had allowed [the] treatment . . . , [it] was, 
for legitimate policy reasons, outlawed in California. It would be contrary to the public policies 
reflected in our cancer treatment statutes to require a physician to discuss treatments those 
statutes proscribe.” Id. As a general matter, held the court, under California’s “patient expec-
tation” standard laid down in Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972), “a treatment that cannot 
legally be administered in this state is not ‘available’ within the meaning of this rule, and 
thus . . . a physician cannot be held liable for failing to disclose the existence of such a treat-
ment.” Schiff, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173. This formulation left open the possibility, however, 
that California doctors could be obligated to inform patients about out-of-state treatment al-
ternatives not outlawed in California. 
 125. See Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 583–84 (Haw. 2011) (ruling 
under “patient expectation” standard that doctors must disclose to patients “recognized serious 
possible risks [and] complications . . . involved in the treatment” (quoting Barcai v. Betwee, 
50 P.3d 946, 959 (Haw. 2002))); Parker v. Ortiz, No. L–0280–08, 2014 WL 4064801, at *7 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (“Concerning the risks that must be disclosed by a physician 
[under ‘patient expectation’ standard], ‘[t]he case law is clear. A plaintiff alleging lack of in-
formed consent has the burden of producing expert testimony to establish that the risk cited 
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When the source of such information is published studies, and those studies are 
contradicted by other studies, this updating may proceed at a slower pace, because 
doctors will have conflicting sources of information. Under such circumstances, in-
stead of informing patients about the controversy, doctors will normally wait for fur-
ther studies that will resolve the conflict. Because they are contradicted by other 
studies, controversial studies that link abortion to depression would ordinarily be ex-
cluded from routine informed-consent conversations between doctors and patients.  
However, the legislative endorsements those studies have received from South 
Dakota and thirteen other states alter the landscape. Those studies have now acquired 
an official seal of approval. This ratification turns the abortion-depression nexus into 
information that reasonable patients might expect to receive. The “reasonable expec-
tation” standard for informed consent consequently may require doctors to give pa-
tients this information. 
Under the “doctors’ custom” standard, by contrast, new medical information does 
not automatically update doctors’ disclosure obligations. Such updating only occurs 
when a substantial number of doctors coalesce around a common practice of provid-
ing particular information to patients. Formation of this professional custom is a slow 
and incremental process.126  
Doctors, however, have independent incentives to expedite that process and in-
corporate new information into their disclosure practices without thorough scrutiny. 
This incentive is twofold. First, doctors’ marginal cost of delivering medical infor-
mation to patients is low. Adding information to a standard informed-consent form 
and briefly explaining it to patients costs doctors very little, yet it practically 
eliminates their prospect of being sued for informed-consent violations.127 Doctors 
                                                                                                                 
 
was one that the defendant should have been aware of because it was known to the medical 
community at the time.’” (quoting Tyndall v. Zaboski, 703 A.2d 980, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1997))); Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1246 (Pa. 2008) (ruling under “patient expecta-
tion” standard that doctors must inform patients about “recognized” risks). 
 126. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 285 (2008) (showing how slow formation of medical and technological customs serv-
ing as benchmarks of tort liability discourages innovation). 
 127. In Karlin v. Foust, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Wisconsin’s informed-consent 
mandate, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)1.f (West Supp. 2015), as allowing doctors to ac-
company the statutory warning that abortion might cause psychological trauma with their own 
assessment of the patient’s situation, which might rule out the prospect of postabortion depres-
sion. 188 F.3d 446, 473 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, 
Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 
Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 21, 23 (encouraging South Dakota doctors to “contextualize the script, 
separating medical fact from legislative conjecture. . . . In essence, it is the physician’s burden 
to rehabilitate a counseling process that has been debauched by the South Dakota legislature”). 
Any such communication, however, could expose the doctor to a malpractice suit that would 
accuse him of downplaying the risk of depression. Doctors consequently have a strong incen-
tive not to downplay the warning. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 36, at 545 (attesting 
that doctors have strong incentive to “generate evidence that will help them fend off liability 
should a malpractice suit be filed against them”); cf. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. 
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 737 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that First Amendment does not 
require that physicians be given an option to disassociate themselves from postabortion de-
pression warnings when these are truthful and nonmisleading). 
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therefore would tend to notify patients about new information even when their 
exposure to liability for not doing so is minimal.128 
As importantly, doctors wish to avoid suit for malpractice and informed-consent 
violations not only for financial reasons but also because of the reputational conse-
quences of an unfavorable disposition of the suit in a verdict or a settlement. Under 
federal law, such verdicts and settlements must be reported to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank—a clearinghouse that collects negative information about 
doctors and makes it accessible to hospitals and other healthcare organizations.129 
For a risk-averse doctor, eliminating the risk of being sued for malpractice conse-
quently becomes a high priority even when the risk is small. Driven by this incentive, 
doctors may relay new information to patients even when there is doubt about the 
information’s credibility and relevance to the treatment.130  
As the number of such doctors grows, their protocols will begin affecting other 
doctors. These other doctors might not fear the prospect of suit as intensely as their 
risk-averse colleagues. They might even conclude that the new information is worth-
less and misleading. Yet, despite their initial disinclination to share the information 
with patients, they might nonetheless decide to do so. This strategy would be entirely 
rational because the disclosure protocols of risk-averse doctors might be interpreted 
by courts as a custom, even if they had not actually become one.131 Furthermore, 
companies that insure doctors against malpractice liability have incentives to condi-
tion their coverage on doctors’ disclosure of all risks associated with a particular 
treatment.132 This may further motivate doctors to include every possible risk in their 
patient-information packets and dialogues. 
In the case of mandatory warnings about postabortion depression, we anticipate 
that this dynamic will unfold in two stages. Initially, the warnings will be adopted by 
doctors who provide abortion services in jurisdictions following the “patient expec-
tation” standard. To date, those warnings have received the seal of approval from 
fourteen states. As we have noted, this state-sponsored information links abortion to 
serious harms that include depression, suicidal thoughts, and, as per South Dakota 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 36, at 519–20, 545 (explaining relevant cost-
benefit tradeoff and applying it to doctors’ decisions).  
 129. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 § 421, 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2012) (re-
quiring reports on medical malpractice payments); see 42 U.S.C. § 11135(b) (2012) (“With 
respect to a medical malpractice action, a hospital which does not request information respect-
ing a physician or practitioner as required under subsection (a) of this section is presumed to 
have knowledge of any information reported under this subchapter to the Secretary with re-
spect to the physician or practitioner.”). “A hospital disregarding negative information about 
a physician to whom it grants attending privileges exposes itself to suit for negligent creden-
tialing.” Astein, Comment to NPDB and Due Process, BILL OF HEALTH (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/08/12/npdb-and-due-process/ [https://perma.cc 
/CR47-F22G]. 
 130. See Gibson, supra note 37, at 1653–61 (arguing that risk aversion motivates doctors 
to take extreme precautions against malpractice liability). 
 131. See id. (identifying a similar dynamic in treatments doctors choose to deliver). 
 132. We attempted to verify this assessment empirically, but insurance companies we con-
tacted declined to reveal their policies.  
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law, actual suicide.133 The probability of those harms is very low, if not negligible.134 
Yet, because this probability is not zero and the harms are serious, doctors in “patient 
expectation” jurisdictions may choose to provide patients with these warnings in or-
der to avoid the risk of suit for informed-consent violations. This risk is real, given 
the presence of numerous organizations willing to subsidize suits against abortion 
providers.135 And there is evidence that these organizations are actively looking for 
opportunities to sue doctors for violating a woman’s “right to know” about post-
abortion depression.136  
Once all “patient expectation” states incorporate the postabortion depression 
warning in their doctors’ disclosure obligations, the number of jurisdictions in which 
doctors give women this warning will rise from fourteen to thirty-one. Among the 
fourteen states that mandate this warning expressly, four states (Minnesota, South 
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) follow the “patient expectation” standard for 
all medical treatments and procedures.137 The update of the doctors’ disclosure obli-
gations will consequently occur in seventeen “patient expectation” jurisdictions out 
of twenty-one. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Washington.138 
This update will mark the beginning of the second and final phase of the South 
Dakota effect. Once doctors in thirty-one jurisdictions begin warning women about 
the risk of postabortion depression, physicians practicing in the “doctors’ custom” 
states will gradually follow suit. These physicians will sense the incipient, if not ac-
tual, change in the general custom of disclosing information to abortion patients.139 
This will also cause physicians to heed the risk of suit, which they can eliminate at a 
very low cost. Importantly, this second update needs to unfold in only twenty out of 
the thirty states that follow the “doctors’ custom” standard.140 Ten out of those thirty 
states have already aligned themselves with South Dakota by enacting statutes di-
recting doctors to warn women about postabortion depression.141 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011). 
 134. See supra note 108. 
 135. See Kathryn A. Eidmann, Acuna and the Abortion Right: Constraints on Informed 
Consent Litigation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 262, 262–63 (2011). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See infra Table 1. 
 138. See infra Table 1. 
 139. There is evidence that physicians are beginning to sense this risk. See Zita Lazzarini, 
South Dakota’s Abortion Script—Threatening the Physician–Patient Relationship, 359 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008) (“Although some may view South Dakota’s restrictive abor-
tion provisions as affecting only the 700 or so women who seek an abortion in that state each 
year, such complacency may be misplaced. These provisions mark a substantial inroad into 
the physician-patient relationship that ought to worry any practicing physician.”). 
 140. See infra Table 1. 
 141. We estimate that these ten states should include Louisiana as well because it has 
adopted a mixed informed-consent standard for procedures other than abortion. See 
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 404 (La. 1988) (extending doctors’ general 
informed-consent obligation to information “material in a reasonable patient’s decision to un-
dergo treatment,” but limiting it to risks that are “medically known” and “significant” rather 
than “rare or remote”). 
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The global notification about postabortion depression issued by the Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America142 is probably the best real-world illustration of 
this dynamic. Planned Parenthood is one of the nation’s largest providers of repro-
ductive health and abortion services.143 It led the constitutional challenge to South 
Dakota’s informed consent statute—ultimately, without success.144 Yet even Planned 
Parenthood warns women about the possibility of postabortion depression.145 As we 
discuss in Part II.C, the organization links this notification to all of its regional web-
sites, including those that serve branches domiciled in the states following the “doc-
tors’ custom” standard for informed consent (and where legislatures have not man-
dated any abortion-specific warnings). Planned Parenthood thus acts similarly to car 
manufacturers who make all of their cars conform to California’s emission require-
ments instead of satisfying the general—and less stringent—EPA standards.146 The 
size and stature of that organization make it reasonable to anticipate that its current 
informed-consent practice will affect other doctors as well. To avoid malpractice 
suits, those doctors might adopt Planned Parenthood’s notification.147 
We summarize this dynamic in Table 1 and the Figures below:  
Table 1. Standards by state 
State Doctors’ 
Custom 
Mandatory Warning 
About Postabortion 
Depression 
Patient 
Expectation 
Alabama   ✔ 
Alaska    ✔ 
Arizona   ✔ 
Arkansas   ✔ 
California   ✔ 
Colorado ✔   
Connecticut   ✔ 
Delaware ✔   
District of Columbia   ✔ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned 
parenthood.org/learn/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures [https://perma.cc/SN4X-G9MY].  
 143. Who We Are, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us 
/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/UE27-CW7B]. 
 144. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (D.S.D. 
2005) (issuing preliminary injunction against South Dakota informed-consent statute), vacated 
en banc, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), remanded to 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D.S.D. 2009) 
(striking down as unconstitutional suicide proviso in South Dakota informed-consent statute), 
aff’d, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding 
“no unconstitutional hindrance of the woman’s choice” in state-mandated advisory linking 
abortion to suicide ideation and suicide). 
 145. In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, supra note 142. 
 146. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 147. We thank Tom Merrill for drawing our attention to this scenario. 
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State Doctors’ 
Custom 
Mandatory Warning 
About Postabortion 
Depression 
Patient 
Expectation 
Florida    ✔ 
Georgia ✔   
Hawaii   ✔ 
Idaho ✔   
Illinois ✔   
Indiana ✔   
Iowa   ✔ 
Kansas ✔ ✔  
Kentucky   ✔ 
Louisiana ✔ ✔  
Maine ✔   
Maryland   ✔ 
Massachusetts   ✔ 
Michigan ✔ ✔  
Minnesota  ✔ ✔ 
Mississippi ✔   
Missouri ✔ ✔  
Montana ✔ ✔  
Nebraska ✔ ✔  
Nevada ✔   
New Hampshire ✔   
New Jersey   ✔ 
New Mexico   ✔ 
New York ✔   
North Carolina ✔ ✔  
North Dakota ✔   
Ohio ✔   
Oklahoma  ✔   
Oregon ✔   
Pennsylvania    ✔ 
Rhode Island ✔   
South Carolina ✔   
South Dakota  ✔ ✔ 
Tennessee  ✔   
Texas ✔ ✔  
Utah ✔ ✔  
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State Doctors’ 
Custom 
Mandatory Warning 
About Postabortion 
Depression 
Patient 
Expectation 
Vermont ✔   
Virginia ✔ ✔  
Washington   ✔ 
West Virginia  ✔ ✔ 
Wisconsin   ✔ ✔ 
Wyoming ✔   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Starting point: Mandatory-warning states 
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Figure 2. Stage 1: Mandatory warnings spread to patient-expectation states 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Stage 2: Mandatory warnings take hold nationwide 
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In compiling the table and figures, we relied on the states’ statutory provisions 
and case law.148 In line with our Article’s goal, Table 1 juxtaposes the special 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 18.05.032(a)(7), .16.060(b)(2) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(A)(1)(c) (Supp. 
2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1703(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 2015); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 
(Cal. 1972) (in bank) (holding that reasonable patient’s expectation standard applies in 
California); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 587 (Colo. 
2004) (holding that “doctors’ custom” standard applies in Colorado); Logan v. Greenwich 
Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983) (holding that reasonable patient’s expectation 
standard applies in Connecticut); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(a)(1)–(2) (2015); Shapira v. 
Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 99 A.3d 217, 221–22 (Del. 2014) (explaining that “doc-
tors’ custom” standard applies in Delaware pursuant to title 18, section 6852(a)(2) of the 
Delaware Code); Miller–McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 439 (D.C. 2007) (citing 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (holding that reasonable patient’s 
expectation standard applies in the District of Columbia); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(a) (West Supp. 2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9-6.1, -9A-3(1), (2012); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3(b) (West Supp. 2014); Cuc Thi Ngo v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 358 P.3d 
26, 37(Haw. 2015) (reaffirming Carr v. Strode and “patient expectation” standard for Hawaii); 
Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (Haw. 1995) (holding that reasonable patient’s expectation 
standard applies in Hawaii); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-604(7), 18-609(2)(c), 39-4506 (Supp. 
2015); Xeniotis v. Cynthia Satko, D.D.S., M.S., P.C., 14 N.E.3d 1207, 1213 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2014) (explaining that in Illinois, “[a] doctor must disclose the risks that a reasonable medical 
professional would have disclosed under similar circumstances” and that “[t]he failure of the 
physician to conform to the professional standard of disclosure must be proven by expert med-
ical evidence”); Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) (reaffirming in abortion case that “doctors’ custom” standard applies in Illinois); IND. 
CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (Supp. 2015); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 101–04 (Ind. 1992) 
(holding that reasonably prudent physician standard applies to informed consent cases in 
Indiana); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Med. Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) (holding that 
reasonable patient’s expectation standard applies in Iowa); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. 
Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 1987) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-
6709(a)(3), -6710(a)(3) (Supp. 2014); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) 
(holding that “doctors’ custom” standard applies in Kansas); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 311.725(1)(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.17 (Supp. 2016); 
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 404–05 (La. 1988) (interpreting Louisiana statute 
as adopting “doctors’ custom” standard); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599-A (2004); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905(1)(A)-(C), (2) (2015) (codifying “doctors’ custom” standard 
for Maine); Ouellette v. Mehalic, 534 A.2d 1331, 1332 (Me. 1988) (holding that “doctors’ 
custom” standard applies in Maine); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1129–30 (Me. 
1980) (same); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977) (holding that reasonable 
patient’s expectation standard applies in Maryland); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S 
(LexisNexis 2004) (indicating possible shift to “doctors’ custom” standard with respect to 
abortion); Harnish v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Mass. 1982) (holding 
that reasonable patient’s expectation standard applies in Massachusetts); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2015); Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 20 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that “doctors’ custom” standard generally applies in 
Michigan); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.4242, .4243(a)(2) (West 2011); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 
295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) (holding that reasonable patient’s expectation standard 
applies in Minnesota); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701–02 (Minn. 1977) (same); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (West 2007); Whittington v. Mason, 905 So. 2d 1261, 
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abortion-related warnings of South Dakota and similar states against the 
informed-consent requirements for abortion procedures in other states. These other 
                                                                                                                 
 
1266 (Miss. 2005) (realigning Mississippi informed-consent law with “doctors’ custom” 
standard); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)–(3) (West Supp. 2015); Aiken v. Clary, 396 
S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965) (holding that “doctors’ custom” standard generally applies in 
Missouri); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-104(5), -304 (2015); Negaard v. Estate of Feda, 446 
P.2d 436, 441 (Mont. 1968) (holding that “doctors’ custom” standard generally applies in 
Montana); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.01(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-2816 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.110 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.253 (LexisNexis 2015); Folger v. Corbett, 394 A.2d 63, 64 (N.H. 
1978) (holding that “doctors’ custom” standard generally applies in New Hampshire); 
Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 462 (N.J. 1999) (holding that reasonable patient’s 
expectation standard applies in New Jersey); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 509 (N.J. 
1988) (per curiam) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. UJI § 13-1104B (2015); N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH 
LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-21.13(a), -21.82(1)(b) 
(West Supp. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(11) (Supp. 2015) (setting up 
“doctors’ custom” standard for informed consent to abortion); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2317.56 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.2, .3 (West 2015) 
(setting forth informed-consent requirement for abortions in Oklahoma using medical 
profession’s standard); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (2013); Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d 204, 210 
(Or. 2000) (en banc); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1) (West 2015); 40 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3 (2008); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-1.7, -10.1(1)(e) (2011 & 
Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 74.103 (2011) (establishing “doctors’ custom” standard for Texas by authorizing panels of 
experts to determine and promulgate doctors’ disclosure obligations to patients); TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012(a)(1)(B), .014 (West Supp. 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7-305.5(2)(a), (o) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-406 (LexisNexis 
2012) (limiting doctors’ disclosure obligations to “substantial and significant” risks, thus 
effectively aligning them with “doctors’ custom” standard); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 98 
(Utah 1982) (reaffirming Utah’s “settled general rule” that “[t]he physician must inform the 
patient of all substantial and significant risks which might occur; yet he need not advise the 
patient of every conceivable risk”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(a)(1) (Supp. 2015); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(F)(3) (2014) (Virginia’s special informed-consent requirements for 
abortion); Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994) (holding that “doctors’ custom” 
standard generally applies in Virginia); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. 1976) (same); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050(2) (West Supp. 2015); Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 
P.2d 950, 956 n.3 (Wash. 1999) (holding that reasonable patient’s expectation standard applies 
in Washington); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2I-3(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011); Adams v. El-Bash, 
338 S.E.2d 381, 385–86 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that reasonable patient’s expectation standard 
generally applies in West Virginia); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 455 (W. Va. 1982) 
(same); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(1)(b)3, (3)(c)1.f (West Supp. 2015); Johnson ex rel. Adler 
v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 501 n.16 (Wis. 1996) (holding that reasonable patient’s 
expectation standard generally applies in Wisconsin); Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219, 222 
(Wyo. 1995) (holding that “doctors’ custom” standard generally applies in Wyoming); Roybal 
v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112 (Wyo. 1989) (same). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H–12.8 (West 
Supp. 2015) (subjecting general hospitals in New Jersey to “doctors’ custom” standard); 
Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d. 929, 931 (Tex. 1983) (holding that disclosures not addressed 
by the state’s statutory Medical Disclosure Panel will be governed by the “patient expectation” 
standard). 
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states’ requirements are predominantly the same for abortion and for other medical 
procedures. Nine states, however, have designed special informed-consent 
requirements for abortion that substitute the generally applicable “doctors’ custom” 
standard with the “patient expectation” standard,149 or vice versa.150  
Our figures summarize the two-stage proliferation of postabortion depression 
warnings. At stage one, as those warnings proliferate in the seventeen “patient ex-
pectation” jurisdictions that presently do not mandate them, the number of jurisdic-
tions in which doctors warn patients about postabortion depression grows from 
fourteen to thirty-one. This increase makes postabortion depression warnings cus-
tomary. At stage two, doctors practicing in the remaining twenty jurisdictions update 
their disclosure obligations in accordance with this emerging custom.  
As we noted at the outset, the South Dakota effect is similar to the California 
effect in one important respect: both effects involve globalization of a local standard. 
This similarity, however, is the only thing that the two effects have in common. The 
activities and incentives that produce those effects differ critically, and policy makers 
should be aware of those differences as well. The California effect is brought about 
by actors’ responses to two incentives: economic attractiveness of the local market 
and the high cost of dual regulatory compliance.151 These incentives lead to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (substituting general “doctors’ cus-
tom” standard, adopted in Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala. 1985) (per curiam), with 
“patient expectation” standard for abortion procedures in Alabama); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 36-2153(A)(1)(c) (2014) (substituting general “doctors’ custom” standard, adopted in 
Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ariz. 1975), with “patient expectation” standard for 
abortion procedures in Arizona); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1703 (b)(1)(B) (2015) (substituting 
general “doctors’ custom” standard, previously codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-
206(b)(1) (2015), with “patient expectation” standard for abortion procedures in Arkansas); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(a) (West Supp. 2016) (substituting general “doctors’ 
custom” standard, codified in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (West 2011) and described in In re 
Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Case—Report No. 12–01, 30 So.3d 596, 606 (Fla. 2013) 
(per curiam), with “patient expectation” standard for abortion procedures in Florida); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 311.725(1)(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (substituting general “doctors’ custom” 
standard, adopted in Keel v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 842 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Ky. 1992), 
with “patient expectation” standard for abortion procedures in Kentucky) ; see also Sargent v. 
Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198 (Ky. 2015) (attesting that under Kentucky law, informed consent is 
generally determined by doctors’ customary practice). 
 150. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(11) (Supp. 2015) (substituting general “patient 
expectation” standard, adopted in Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638 N.W.2d 1, 8–9 (N.D. 2002), with 
“doctors’ custom” standard for abortion procedures in North Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2317.56 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2015) (substituting general “patient expectation” stand-
ard, adopted in Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ohio 1985), with “doctors’ cus-
tom” standard for abortion procedures in Ohio); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.2, .3 
(Supp. 2016) (laying down special informed-consent requirement for abortions in Oklahoma 
that uses medical profession’s standards while overriding the general “actual patient’s expec-
tation” approach adopted by Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557–59 (Okla. 1979)); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 23-4.7-3 (2008) (substituting general “patient expectation” standard, adopted in Miller 
v. Rhode Island Hospital, 625 A.2d 778, 783–85 (R.I. 1993), with “doctors’ custom” standard 
for abortion procedures in Rhode Island). 
 151. These incentives are best explained in Anu Bradford’s discussion of the Brussels 
ef\fect, the European cousin of the California effect. Bradford, supra note 39, at 17 (“The 
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productive activities that benefit society (e.g., manufacture of cars that minimize 
damage to the environment).152 Activities that produce the South Dakota effect, on 
the other hand, are completely divorced from productivity. Far from being welfare 
enhancing, those activities instill in abortion patients unnecessary fear and anxiety 
that may undermine their ability to make informed choices.  
C. Empirical Evidence 
Thus far, our discussion of the South Dakota effect has been theoretical. We have 
not raised, let alone answered, the question of whether the antiabortion statutes of 
South Dakota and like-minded states have to date caused doctors from other juris-
dictions to change their behavior.  
This question is undeniably important, but we cannot provide a definite answer. 
The absence of information about doctors’ confidential communications with abor-
tion patients and the inaccessibility of informed-consent forms for abortion prevent 
us from doing so. We do, however, provide a tentative answer. First, we show that 
suits against doctors for failure to inform patients about possible postabortion de-
pression have become a real threat in the post-Casey world. Second, we examine the 
information given to prospective patients by one of the nation’s largest providers of 
reproductive health services and abortion: the Planned Parenthood Federation of America.153 
The Casey decision did not merely approve special informed-consent require-
ments for abortion.154 It also appeared, at least to some, to credit the view that the 
risk of postabortion depression is real.155 This prompted an experienced practitioner 
to publish an article warning abortion doctors about their potential liability for failure 
                                                                                                                 
 
exporter has an incentive to adopt a global standard whenever its production or conduct is 
nondivisible across different markets or when the benefits of a uniform standard due to scale 
economies exceed the costs of forgoing lower production costs in less regulated markets.”). 
 152. Cf. id. at 64 (observing that self-globalizing, but ill-designed, regulations erode social 
welfare). 
 153. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org [https://perma.cc/C68Y-X9H3]. 
 154. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992). 
 155. Id. at 882 (crediting the possibility that “a woman may elect an abortion, only to dis-
cover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully in-
formed”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable 
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. . . . Severe depres-
sion and loss of esteem can follow.” (citation omitted)). For a markedly different perspective, 
see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force 
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, 
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family 
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.”). For scholarship raising con-
cerns about this sort of Supreme Court factual claim, see Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting 
Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2012) (critiquing Supreme Court’s 
“in-house” fact finding and citing, as an example, the Court’s factual claims in Carhart re-
garding “the emotional consequences of abortions generally”). See also Jeannie Suk, The 
Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1200 (2010) (tracing roots of idea of “abortion trauma” in Carhart). 
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to inform patients about that risk.156 The article argued that doctors must inform pa-
tients about possible postabortion depression under both “doctors’ custom” and 
“patient expectation” standards.157  
This idea came to occupy the agenda of organizations that use medical mal-
practice suits as an antiabortion weapon.158 Unsurprisingly, this weapon became par-
ticularly popular after Casey.159 Reporting suggests that a number of plaintiffs funded 
by antiabortion organizations sued doctors for failure to inform the plaintiffs about 
postabortion depression.160 One of those organizations apparently developed and 
distributed a manual for attorneys that explained how to file such suits.161 There is, 
however, very limited public information about such suits. Our research has 
uncovered only three suits that have been litigated to judgment and ended in 
published decisions. One of those suits, Acuna v. Turkish,162 has been the subject of 
extensive public and scholarly attention.163 The other two, Perez v. Park Madison 
Professional Laboratories164 and Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chicago Area,165 are 
far less known.166 
In Acuna, the plaintiff tied her alleged emotional distress to the realization that 
she had killed an “existing human being” by having an abortion.167 She claimed that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion Psychological 
Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639 (1996). 
 157. Specifically, it claimed that  
a physician’s withholding of important information on the risks of potential 
harmful psychological and emotional consequences arising from an abortion, ab-
sent significant justifying factors, will be viewed . . . as usurping the patient’s 
right to informed consent. . . . [W]e may expect a generally uniform response in 
both patient and professional rule jurisdictions to the problems of how and to 
what extent the patient should be informed of potential emotional and psycho-
logical problems.  
Id. at 666. 
 158. See Eidmann, supra note 135, at 268; Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: 
Enhancing the Common-Law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
489, 494 (“There are increasing indications that abortion malpractice litigation is on the rise. 
At least some of that litigation, moreover, may stem from pro-life advocates attempting to 
dissuade doctors from performing abortions.”). 
 159. Eidmann, supra note 135, at 268 (reporting that “[a]bortion malpractice strategies be-
came increasingly popular in the mid-1990s” and providing examples). 
 160. Id. at 272–73. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007); Acuna v. Turkish, 915 A.2d 1045 (N.J. 2007), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 825 (2007). 
 163. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 47, at 1603–04 (discussing Acuna and its implications); 
Eidmann, supra note 135 (same); Manian, supra note 50, at 261 & n.261 (same); Nadia N. 
Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 & n.52 (2011) (same). 
 164. 630 N.Y.S.2d 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 165. 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 166. See also Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1035, 1038 (Kan. 1990) (affirming dis-
missal of patient’s suit for doctor’s failure to warn her about emotional distress originating 
from abortion carried out to eliminate life-threatening risks in continuing the pregnancy). 
 167. 930 A.2d at 418. 
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her physician ought to have informed her of this but failed to do so, thereby violating 
her informed-consent right.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled for the defendant. It reasoned that the plain-
tiff’s view of the embryo as an “existing human being” was not a medical fact but rather 
a “moral, theological, or philosophical” proposition.168 For that reason, the court held 
that a patient—even in a “patient expectation” state like New Jersey—could not 
reasonably expect doctors to tell her that an embryo is an existing human being.169  
The Acuna court acknowledged the existence of the South Dakota statute requir-
ing doctors to inform patients that abortion terminates the life “of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being.”170 The court declined, however, to import the South 
Dakota view of abortion into the New Jersey doctrine of informed consent. This de-
cision was motivated by the court’s unwillingness to include information it deemed 
“nonmedical” in doctors’ disclosure obligations.171 
Importantly, the court also noted that 
[p]laintiff has not pointed out whether even a small minority of physi-
cians currently give such instructions. Plaintiff has not directed us to any 
jurisdiction or any court that has found a common law duty requiring 
doctors to tell their pregnant patients that aborting an embryo is the kill-
ing of an existing human being—an instruction suggesting that both the 
doctor and patient would be complicit in committing the equivalent of 
murder.172 
This decision consequently leaves open the possibility that future plaintiffs might 
claim that they have been improperly denied medical information about the low prob-
ability of postabortion depression. Under New Jersey’s “patient expectation” stand-
ard, reaffirmed by the Acuna court,173 doctors must give patients medical information 
that covers low-probability scenarios and nonrecommended treatment options.174 
Such information may well originate from another state: all that matters is the infor-
mation’s medical nature. This understanding of Acuna may prompt cautious doctors 
to include the postabortion depression possibility in their patient-information packets.  
Our projection that informed-consent laws might take this path is bolstered by the 
Perez case, in which a New York appellate court applied New York’s “doctors’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Id. at 425–26 (“Clearly, there is no consensus in the medical community or society 
supporting plaintiff’s position that a six- to eight-week-old embryo is, as a matter of biological 
fact—as opposed to a moral, theological, or philosophical judgment—‘a complete, separate, 
unique and irreplaceable human being’ or that terminating an early pregnancy involves ‘actu-
ally killing an existing human being.’”). 
 169. Id. at 426. 
 170. Id. at 427 (acknowledging S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34–23A–10.1(1)(b), (d) (2011)). 
 171. Id. at 425–26. 
 172. Id. at 427. 
 173. Id. at 425. 
 174. For example, in Matthies v. Mastromonaco, the court ruled that it might have been 
reasonable for an elderly osteoporotic patient to expect her doctor to inform her about an op-
eration that required installation of bone screws and was contraindicated for patients in her 
condition. 733 A.2d 456, 459, 464 (N.J. 1999). 
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custom” standard.175 This case involved a twenty-four-year-old woman who 
underwent a second-trimester abortion procedure.176 Prior to that procedure, her 
doctor’s clinic gave her a patient-information packet that included a warning about 
postabortion depression.177 The woman then signed an informed-consent form 
confirming that she had read about and fully understood the abortion risks specified 
in the packet.178 However, in her subsequent suit against the doctor, the woman 
argued that the information she received was deficient. Specifically, she claimed that 
her “crisis pregnancy” situation required the doctor to talk her out of the abortion.179 
The court rejected this claim.180 The court held that doctors practicing in New 
York have no obligation to talk patients out of abortions181 and concluded that the 
defendant’s postabortion depression warnings aligned with the state’s informed-
consent requirements.182 This decision suggests that warning about postabortion de-
pression was not beyond the defendant’s call of duty (perhaps because this was a 
second-trimester abortion).183 Remarkably, the defendant’s standard form for in-
formed consent included this warning, which indicates that at least some doctors 
were providing the warning even in the period immediately following Casey.184 
The plaintiff in a more recent case, Doe v. Planned Parenthood,185 raised two 
independent claims based on her doctor’s failure to alert her to the postabortion 
depression possibility. She first alleged that the defendants—the Planned Parenthood 
doctors, nurses, and counsel—failed to inform her “that an abortion ‘procedure 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. Perez v. Park Madison Prof’l Labs., 630 N.Y.S.2d 37, 40–41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 176. Id. at 38–39. 
 177. Id. at 39. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 41. As the court described her claims, “[a]ccording to plaintiff, this harm [re-
sulting from the abortion] includes mental anguish, neurosis, guilt, sleeplessness and depres-
sion from the awareness that, by reason of defendant's negligence, she needlessly committed 
an act which is in violation of her deep-seated convictions.” Id. at 40. 
 180. Id. at 41. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 40–41 (“Having received accurate information concerning her medical condi-
tion at the time of her abortion, as well as of all the physical and emotional risks attendant 
upon the procedure, plaintiff was obviously the only person in a position to know whether an 
abortion under those circumstances was in violation of her personal convictions. She cannot 
seek to hold defendant liable because those convictions have apparently changed since she 
consented to and underwent the procedure.”). 
 183. See id. at 39 (describing the packet, which referred to the “‘possible problems related 
to second trimester abortions’ including the potential medical and emotional risks”). 
 184. Id.; see also id. at 40 (“[E]vidence in this case shows that plaintiff was specifically 
told of the risk of sadness and depression and the possibility of serious depression as a result 
of an abortion.”).  
 185. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). Note that 
plaintiff was represented by Harold Cassidy, the same attorney who brought the Acuna case 
and the chief architect of the South Dakota law. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: 
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1641, 1646 n.16 (2008) (detailing Cassidy’s involvement in South Dakota legislation); 
see also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1027 & n.150 (same). 
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would terminate the life of a second patient, a living human being as a matter of 
biological fact.’”186 The second claim charged that the defendants failed to notify her 
that “there is a greater risk of . . . depression . . . in women who undergo an abortion 
than in those who give birth.”187 The first of those complaints was identical to the 
plaintiff’s allegation in Acuna,188 and the court relied heavily on Acuna in rejecting it.189  
Remarkably, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s action without addressing her sec-
ond claim. In reaching that decision, the court assumed that this claim, too, relied on 
the already-rejected theory that ascribes “living human being” status to embryos.190 
Alas, this assumption was wrong. The plaintiff’s second claim alluded to the general 
incidence of postabortion depression as an empirical fact unassociated with any spe-
cific perception of embryos. The court therefore should have properly addressed this 
argument but failed to do so. Under current law, however, this argument would have 
been unlikely to prevail; this is because Illinois follows the “doctors’ custom” stand-
ard,191 under which doctors are not obligated to notify patients about remote sce-
narios that the medical profession deems immaterial.192 
The upshot of the preceding analysis is straightforward. Although the “doctors’ 
custom” standard does not presently obligate doctors to warn patients about post-
abortion depression, under the “patient expectation” standard things might be differ-
ent. As we have explained, the “patient expectation” standard requires doctors to 
inform patients about remote scenarios that involve substantial harm to the patient.193 
This standard therefore provides fertile ground for the South Dakota effect.194  
This understanding of the current legal situation is far from speculative. As we 
have noted, it guides the operations of the Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America, a major organization that provides reproductive health and abortion ser-
vices to millions of women across the United States.195 Planned Parenthood informs 
women contemplating an abortion that, although “[s]erious, long-term emotional 
problems after abortion are . . . uncommon,” they have been observed in some 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. Doe, 956 N.E.2d at 567. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. 2007). 
 189. Doe, 956 N.E.2d at 572 (“We echo the observation of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
No court, regardless of where it sits, has found a common law duty requiring doctors to tell 
their pregnant patients that aborting an embryo, or fetus, is the killing of an existing human 
being.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 190. Id. at 573–74. 
 191. Id. at 568–59. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 194. Although none of these cases resulted in victories for the plaintiffs, they may none-
theless represent examples of what Douglas NeJaime has termed “winning through losing.” 
As NeJaime explains, “[l]itigation loss may, counterintuitively, produce winners. When savvy 
advocates lose in court, they may nonetheless configure the loss in ways that result in produc-
tive social movement effects and lead to more effective reform strategies.” Douglas NeJaime, 
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (2011); see also Ben Depoorter, Essay, 
The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (2013) (analyzing strategic decisions of liti-
gants who pursue hopeless litigation to highlight misfortunes and create public outcry).  
 195. See Learn, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (2014), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn 
[https://perma.cc/MK52-LXFN].  
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cases.196 The organization then moves on to clarify that women “having a history of 
emotional problems,” “having important people in [their lives] who aren’t supportive 
of [their] decision to have an abortion,” or “having to terminate a wanted pregnancy 
[for health reasons]” are more likely to develop serious postabortion depression.197 
Consistent with our projection,198 Planned Parenthood also apprises women of the 
fact that “[s]erious, long-term emotional problems after abortion are about as un-
common as they are after giving birth.”199 
All of this shows that the South Dakota effect is real rather than merely theoreti-
cal. To the extent that it forces doctors to instill medically unsubstantiated fears in 
their abortion patients, this effect is unfair to women in at least two ways. First, it 
may dissuade women from electing abortions they have determined are in their best 
interests.200 Second, it may actually make postabortion depression more likely, since 
the risk of being depressed after an abortion is not independent of the abortion expe-
rience itself. Remarkably, two studies have identified a positive correlation between 
the intensity of antiabortion activities outside of clinics—picketing, demonstrations, 
and related activities—and patients’ postabortion depression symptoms.201 It is en-
tirely possible that warnings about postabortion depression could have similar 
effects.  
The South Dakota effect is also detrimental to the practice of medicine, intruding 
into the doctor-patient relationship and compelling doctors to provide information 
they do not believe is necessary, medically accurate, or in their patients’ best 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 142.  
 197. Id. 
 198. See supra Part II. Arguably, Planned Parenthood may also be trying to prevent unfa-
vorable legislation in the states that have yet to follow the South Dakota example by making 
such legislation unnecessary. Cf. Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629 
(2008) (revealing that organizations often have reasons for acting preemptively to make unfa-
vorable legislation unnecessary). We thank Judge Joseph Colquitt for alerting us to this 
possibility. 
 199. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 142. 
 200. See Cynthia R. Daniels, Janna Ferguson, Grace Howard & Amanda Roberti, Informed 
or Misinformed Consent? Abortion Policy in the United States, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
LAW 181, 181 (2016) (finding states’ statutory informed-consent materials regarding embryo-
logical and fetal development medically inaccurate and misleading). 
 201. Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects of Anti-Abortion Demonstrators 
and Pro-Choice Escorts on Women’s Psychological Responses to Abortion, 13 J. SOC & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 404 (1994); Catherine Cozzarelli, Brenda Major, Angela Karrasch & 
Kathleen Fuegen, Women’s Experiences of and Reactions to Antiabortion Picketing, 22 BASIC 
& APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 265 (2000). Such research suggests that warnings about post-
abortion depression may turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. See Harper Jean Tobin, 
Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 
17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 125 (2008) (“The harm of such requirements most likely lies 
less in scaring women into not getting abortions, but in elevating the fear and anxiety women 
experience when they do have abortions.”). But see Diana Greene Foster, Katrina Kimport, 
Heather Gould, Sarah C.M. Roberts & Tracy A. Weitz, Effect of Abortion Protesters on 
Women’s Emotional Response to Abortion, 87 CONTRACEPTION 81, 86 (2013) (showing that 
protesters do upset women seeking abortion services, but the women’s negative emotions are 
transient). 
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interests.202 With all this in mind, we now turn to developing a legal mechanism that 
will eliminate these effects. This mechanism will prevent South Dakota–style 
informed-consent requirements from taking hold nationwide.  
III. SOLUTIONS 
The South Dakota effect poses a real threat—to women seeking to exercise the 
right announced in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey, to doctors seeking to provide their 
patients with appropriate and personalized care, and to basic precepts of federal-
ism.203 Absent the South Dakota effect, women who sought to terminate their preg-
nancies in most states could do so without encountering a litany of medically un-
necessary warnings designed to communicate a preference for childbirth over 
abortion and, ultimately, to dissuade them from electing the abortion procedure. And 
absent the South Dakota effect, states would not be burdened by spillovers that in-
terfere with their determinations of how to balance the competing interests identified 
in Roe and Casey.  
Moreover, women who find themselves subject to heightened warnings in states 
that do not legislatively mandate such warnings could find themselves in a difficult 
position, beyond the burden of simply receiving the warnings; that is, though the 
warnings themselves may be untruthful and misleading and thus contravene Casey, 
women in such states will be unable to mount constitutional challenges to these po-
tentially unconstitutional warnings because they are not mandated by statute or other-
wise the product of state action.204  
As we have shown, the South Dakota effect works not because of the quality of 
the information that it spreads across the states. Indeed, the prevailing view of the 
medical community is that the risk of postabortion depression is likely to be in-
significant for the majority of patients and, in any event, comparable to the risk of 
depression faced by women who carry pregnancies to term, particularly unwanted 
pregnancies.205 The effect works, instead, because of the nature of the law of in-
formed consent. Because many states mandate the provision of information about all 
conceivable risks of substantial harm, the South Dakota effect exposes doctors, even 
in states that have not mandated any abortion-specific warnings, to suit for informed-
consent violation while offering them an expedient way to avoid suit. And because 
the remaining states base their informed-consent standards on dominant medical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. See Lazzarini, supra note 139, at 2189 (“The [South Dakota] law is unique in ways 
that should cause concern to physicians, patients, and protectors of the physician–patient rela-
tionship. As part of an ongoing challenge to abortion, it has import far beyond the borders of 
South Dakota.”). 
 203. Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right To 
Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 463 
(1992) (“American citizens may be subject to different moral agendas in different locations. 
This is the essence of American federalism.”). 
 204. We thank Reva Siegel for bringing this point to our attention.  
 205. See Sawicki, supra note 163, at 12 n.42; Siegel, supra note 16, at 1719 n.81.  
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practice, the South Dakota effect threatens to upend medical practice in those states 
as well.206  
As we have noted, the Supreme Court has expressly approved heightened 
informed-consent warnings in the context of abortion.207 But even in the absence of 
that approval, conventional federalism doctrine would seem to offer South Dakota 
and like-minded states considerable latitude to experiment—within the bounds of the 
Constitution—with the optimal balance between women’s autonomy and dignity in-
terests, on the one hand, and the state’s interest in protecting potential life, on the 
other. This latitude stems from the basic tenets of federalism, which views states as 
social laboratories208 engaged in “innovation and experimentation”209 while compet-
ing against each other “for a mobile citizenry.”210  
Here, however, neither truth seeking nor pluralism and fair competition is at play. 
Instead, the South Dakota view of postabortion depression threatens to take hold na-
tionally regardless of merit. Rather than allow truth to prevail after a robust 
competition on the marketplace of ideas, the informed-consent laws of South Dakota 
and like-minded states may lead to the diffusion of unchecked information across 
state lines. 
Some might argue that the South Dakota effect will be mitigated by “abortion 
exceptionalism.”211 States, so goes the argument, adopt and implement their distinct 
preferences and policies with regard to abortion. These preferences and policies are 
determined primarily by politically active citizens and interest groups. State courts 
will tend to follow these internal preferences and policies, while refusing to 
incorporate legal rules or norms that emanate from ideologically dissimilar states. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Cf. Lazzarini, supra note 139, at 2191 (“Although some may view South Dakota’s 
restrictive abortion provisions as affecting only the 700 or so women who seek an abortion in 
that state each year, such complacency may be misplaced. These provisions mark a substantial 
inroad into the physician–patient relationship that ought to worry any practicing physician.”). 
 207. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); cf. Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  
 208. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
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its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 209. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also MALCOLM FEELEY & 
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CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–1500 (1987) (book review) (discussing “[i]nnovation and competi-
tion in government” arguments for federalism); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause 
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988).  
 210. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also Epstein, supra note 24, at 150 (“The great virtue 
of federalism is that it introduces an important measure of competition between 
governments.”). 
 211. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1210 
(2014) (“Abortion exceptionalism means the rules are different for abortion cases.”). 
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This dynamic could immunize the informed-consent doctrines of pro-choice states 
against the South Dakota effect.212 
We believe that this mitigating effect is limited. Abortion exceptionalism is a 
“soft” cultural and political phenomenon, whereas the South Dakota effect is 
grounded in doctrine. Consider a doctor who provides abortion services in 
Connecticut—a “patient expectation” state213 with comparatively permissive abor-
tion laws. Once the South Dakota effect takes hold, can this doctor ignore what she 
feels may be an emerging duty to notify patients about the small risk of postabortion 
depression? We believe that the doctor cannot do so, even if she is very optimistic 
about the effect of Connecticut’s abortion exceptionalism on the courts’ malpractice 
decisions. The reason is simple: the doctor’s optimism gives her no guarantee of im-
munity against malpractice accusations in the event she decides not to warn her pa-
tients about postabortion depression. On the other hand, the doctor can eliminate the 
prospect of liability by introducing South Dakota’s information into her informed-
consent dialogues with patients; and as we have explained, she can do so at a very 
low cost to herself.214  
For these reasons, the South Dakota effect is likely to change doctors’ practices 
in “patient expectation” jurisdictions—a change that will incrementally affect doc-
tors’ customs as well.215 We are skeptical about state courts’ ability to stop this pro-
cess, given the self-updating and doctor-dependent nature of the informed-consent 
doctrine. Note in this connection that doctors motivated by the desire to fend off 
malpractice suits will respond to the South Dakota effect before courts, as illustrated 
by the Planned Parenthood example.216 The South Dakota effect therefore calls for a 
robust countermeasure best provided by proactive legislators. 
Based on this observation, we now develop two legislative solutions: federal and 
state. We first present these solutions and then discuss their distinct advantages and 
disadvantages.  
A. Federalizing Informed Consent 
The first possibility we envision is for Congress to create a federal default stand-
ard establishing that abortion-specific rules of informed consent can only be created 
by affirmative state legislation or through the organic evolution of doctors’ customs. 
Under this federal statute, doctors would only be required to inform patients about 
the risk of postabortion depression under two circumstances: 1) if such warnings 
were consistent with accepted standards in the field, or 2) if state statute expressly 
required them to do so. In either case, warnings could only be mandated subject to 
Casey’s “truthful, nonmisleading information” proviso.217  
This proposal is consistent with one of the basic precepts of mainstream theories 
of federalism: while generally avoiding interference with state sovereignty, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. We thank Gillian Metzger for this insight.  
 213. Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 300–01 (Conn. 1983) (holding that 
reasonable patient’s expectation standard applies in Connecticut). 
 214. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text. 
 217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
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should step in to protect states from undesirable spillover effects from other states.218 
As Professor Gillian Metzger has noted in connection with interstate relations, 
“[i]nstitutionally, Congress is best positioned to determine the national interest and 
the need for state restrictions.”219 Indeed, even scholars who contend that interstate 
spillovers should under some circumstances be celebrated—as do Professor Heather 
Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt220—also believe that Congress has a role to play in medi-
ating such spillovers.221  
We turn now to the mechanics of this proposal. We begin by sketching out the 
core elements of a federal legislative solution to the problems posed by the South 
Dakota effect. We then defend the constitutionality of that solution.  
1. The Proposed Legislation  
A federal legislative solution to the South Dakota effect could take a number of 
different forms, ranging from the creation of a federal default standard to complete 
preemption of state law.222 Among these solutions, we restrict our discussion to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 892–93; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
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Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. 
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Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222–23 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Interstate 
Competition]. 
 219. Metzger, supra note 45, at 1531. See also POSNER supra note 24, at 893 (“Insofar as 
a coordinated response is optimal, and given transaction costs, . . . it doesn’t make sense to 
leave the response to state and local governments.”); cf. Revesz, Interstate Competition, supra 
note 218, at 1222–24 (justifying federal regulation that counters interstate externalities and 
race to the bottom). 
 220. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 108 (“Congress is the most obvious institution 
safeguarding horizontal federalism, just as it was Wechsler’s prime candidate for safeguarding 
vertical federalism.” (footnote omitted)). 
 221. Id.; see also Mark D. Rosen, Essay, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2010) (arguing that Congress, not the courts, is best situated 
to check “states’ exercise of extraterritorial powers”). 
 222. The more aggressive approach would involve the creation of a uniform federal stand-
ard for informed consent to abortion, preempting all state informed-consent laws in the context 
of abortion. See O’Connor & Ribstein, supra note 111 at 664 (arguing that where states do not 
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one that would be least politically controversial: the creation of a federal default 
standard that would allow doctors in most states to practice without fear of the 
spillover effects described above. As we envision it, the federal statute would provide 
that, absent state legislative action to the contrary, no abortion-specific informed-
consent warnings would be read into doctors’ professional norms of conduct, unless 
doctors’ customs had coalesced around the provision of such warnings. This statute 
would counteract the South Dakota effect, preserving the general standards in effect 
in the majority of states.  
Importantly, states would remain free to legislate around our proposed default 
rule—South Dakota, for example, would not be prevented by such a rule from 
implementing its chosen informed-consent law. Federal law would merely create a 
safe harbor for doctors working in the states that did not legislate any heightened 
warnings. These doctors would be able to practice without fear of suit for failure to 
provide their patients with South Dakota’s (or similar) warnings about the risks of 
abortion. 
Prior to legislating, Congress would be well advised to engage in factfinding 
around the actual risks of abortion procedures, including in particular any risks 
related to depression and suicide ideation. This factfinding undertaking should rely 
on testimony by medical experts, psychologists, and social scientists. Consideration 
of the views and research of experts would substantially improve the quality of the 
resulting legislation.223  
As we have noted, there is broad consensus within the medical profession that no 
serious risks of depression, suicide, or suicide ideation attend ordinary abortion pro-
cedures.224 We expect that a thorough assessment of the available evidence would 
lead Congress to that conclusion. But even if some conflicting evidence were pre-
sented during the course of congressional factfinding—and there likely would 
be225—Congress would still be entitled to act. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, “The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discre-
tion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty. . . . 
Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abor-
tion context any more than it does in other contexts.”226 Accordingly, so long as the 
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 223. In addition, some factfinding around the nexus of abortion and informed consent with 
interstate commerce would ensure that the statute was on firm constitutional footing. 
 224. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 225. Although the weight of authority supports the position that there is minimal risk, some 
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 226. 550 U.S. 124, 163–64 (2007). The Carhart Court made clear, however, that “un-
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findings were demonstrably false. Id. at 165–66. And the Court confirmed in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt that where medical or scientific evidence does not support a particular 
regulation of abortion, courts are not required to defer to legislatures. No. 15-274, slip op. at 
23 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (finding that “nothing in Texas’ record evidence“ established that “the 
new law advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health.”). See generally 
Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for 
the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM (forthcoming 2016). 
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weight of medical and scientific authority was found to support the view that 
warnings about postabortion depression are unnecessary as a blanket matter, 
Congress would be well within its power to enact the proposed statute.227 
2. Constitutional Foundation  
Congress, of course, may only act pursuant to a specific constitutional grant of 
power.228 The congressional action we propose—legislation to set a federal default 
standard for informed consent in the context of abortion procedures—would be un-
dertaken under the Commerce Clause.229 A brief overview of recent Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence establishes that our proposal would clearly constitute a permis-
sible exercise of congressional power.230 
Although the past twenty years have seen substantial shifts, as well as a number 
of competing strains, in the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence,231 the 
Court has continued to affirm that “Congress has broad authority under the 
[Commerce] Clause.”232 Among other things, Congress has the power to “regulate 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”233  
United States v. Morrison234 supplies a four-part test that a number of courts have 
applied when assessing Commerce Clause challenges to federal enactments: first, 
whether the regulated activity is economic in nature; second, whether the relevant 
federal statute contains an explicit jurisdictional requirement that the activity in ques-
tion has a connection to, or effect on, interstate commerce; third, the existence of 
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 228. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
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546 (1995), seemed to signal a renewed judicial interest in policing the limits of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers.  
 232. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. 
 233. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2007); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 
(“Congress may regulate . . . ‘those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.’” 
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 234. 529 U.S. 598. 
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congressional findings regarding impact on interstate commerce; and fourth, the 
strength of the link between the activity in question and interstate commerce.235  
Federal informed-consent legislation would clearly satisfy Morrison’s four-part 
test. As a threshold matter, abortion itself is ordinarily a commercial transaction 
—the provision of medical services for compensation.236 The Court has not always 
spoken with perfect clarity about the relationship between “commercial activity” and 
“economic activity,” but the activities it found to be outside of congressional reach 
in both Morrison itself and United States v. Lopez—violence against women and gun 
possession, respectively—clearly lacked the critical feature of a compensated trans-
action. Here, the requisite transactional component is unquestionably present.237 
Our proposed statute would also contain the language “in or affecting interstate 
commerce,” which would satisfy Morrison’s requirement of a jurisdictional element. 
And the “congressional findings” requirement is a central element of our legislative 
proposal: as noted earlier, the legislation we contemplate would be preceded by a 
rigorous congressional investigation into the psychological effects of abortion.  
Equally clear is the nexus of abortion services with interstate commerce. Even 
with a rash of state laws designed to shut down clinics and limit abortions,238 abortion 
remains one of the most common surgical procedures performed in the country.239 
Patients seeking abortions may, and often do, cross state lines to visit clinics; doctors 
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Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (lifting injunction, with limited excep-
tion); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (invalidating 
Mississippi’s admitting-privileges requirement); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange,  
33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (invalidating Alabama’s admitting-privileges 
requirement). 
 239. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the 
United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 8 (2003); Rachel K. Jones & 
Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2011, 46 
PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 3, 3 (2014) (estimating that 1.1 million abortions were 
performed in the United States in 2011). 
2016] ABORTION AND REGULATORY SPILLOVER  49 
 
and clinic staff do the same.240 Medical supplies may be purchased across state lines; 
insurance plans may originate in another state, or be administered there.241  
Abortion itself, then, clearly impacts interstate commerce. But the precise subject 
of federal regulation contemplated here—the standards governing legal liability for 
conduct related to patient warnings in the course of providing abortion services 
—also has a significant impact on interstate commerce. Doctors secure medical mal-
practice insurance on interstate markets; they may be sued for informed-consent vio-
lations in state or federal courts, by citizens of their own state or other states; and 
they may choose jurisdictions in which to practice based on different liability re-
gimes, some of which are expressly designed to attract doctors from other states.242 
Admittedly, the Court’s most recent Commerce Clause pronouncement, NFIB v. 
Sebelius,243 suggests a contraction in the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause au-
thority; and, since the broad subject matter of the statute scrutinized in NFIB—health 
care—is related to the present issue, the case warrants careful consideration. But such 
consideration establishes that none of the infirmities the Court found in NFIB is pre-
sent here.  
At issue in NFIB was the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that all individuals 
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty (“the individual mandate”). In finding that 
the individual mandate exceeded the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion focused first on the novelty of the individual man-
date, explaining that “sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitu-
tional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.”244 No 
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such suggestion could be made here. Congress has a long history of regulating the 
medical profession,245 including in the context of both medical malpractice and 
abortion.  
The Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, which, among other things, 
created the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), supplies the most important 
precedent. The NPDB collects data on malpractice judgments, settlements, and disci-
plinary actions, and makes that data available to hospitals and other medical care 
organizations.246 Although the Supreme Court has never considered the question, 
courts of appeals have uniformly rejected Commerce Clause and other constitutional 
challenges to the NPDB.247 This fact is of paramount importance for our purposes: 
among other things, the NPDB collects information about doctors’ informed-consent 
violations.248 This information becomes part of doctors’ malpractice records, which 
hospitals and other medical care organizations use for purposes of hiring, promoting, 
and credentialing.249  
In addition, the legislation we propose is consistent with a tradition of congres-
sional regulation of a number of aspects of abortion. First, in the Freedom of Access 
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE),250 Congress broadly prohibited threats and 
violence directed at either providers or consumers of abortion services. Every federal 
appellate court to consider the constitutionality of FACE has upheld it as a permissi-
ble exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.251 And, although the Supreme 
Court has not directly considered FACE’s constitutionality, in 2014 it suggested that 
Massachusetts could avoid the First Amendment infirmities that doomed that state’s 
“buffer zone” law252 by modeling its state law after the federal FACE.253  
Perhaps still more telling is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
(PBABA),254 which the Court upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart.255 Although the 
Carhart Court did not undertake any sustained examination of Congress’s power to 
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enact the PBABA, it did note in passing that “the legislative power” was “exercised 
in this instance under the Commerce Clause.”256 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice 
Scalia, wrote separately to state his view that “whether the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003 constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause [was] not before the Court.”257 But the majority was silent on any 
potential Commerce Clause concerns.258  
In light of this extensive record of federal regulation of both medical malpractice 
and abortion, it seems clear that the modest step we propose would be well within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. In fact, it is likely that Congress could, if it 
wished, go much further than our proposal. Indeed, Professor Richard Fallon argues 
that “[i]f Congress so chose, it could either forbid or protect abortion on a nation-
wide basis.”259  
Our proposal might face one additional constitutional objection. Arguably, legis-
lation along the lines we suggest would inject Congress into a sphere that has tradi-
tionally been regulated by the states alone—setting substantive liability standards for 
a category of tort actions.260 United States v. Lopez suggested that congressional 
attempts to regulate areas of “traditional state concern”261 would be constitutionally 
suspect.262 
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But Congress has long since entered the domain of torts through numerous statu-
tory interventions into products liability,263 including liability for medications,264 
medical devices,265 and vaccines.266 One of those interventions, the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,267 was quite far-reaching. With this Act, 
Congress displaced the entire regime of state products liability with a special com-
pensation program for vaccine-related injuries.268 Our proposal is a far more limited one. 
One final objection to this proposal, perhaps the most serious one, is grounded not 
in legal but in political constraints. Although “[s]pillovers can get issues on the na-
tional policymaking agenda,”269 politics, especially at the national level, are more 
polarized today than perhaps at any other time in our history.270 And independent of 
larger polarization trends, abortion has for decades been one of the most divisive 
issues in American politics.271 Mindful of the possibility that tackling this subject 
might merely afford federal legislators an opportunity to reengage in democratic war-
fare over abortion, we offer an alternative solution to the South Dakota effect: legis-
lation within the states.  
B. A State-by-State Solution  
Another possible response to the South Dakota effect is for individual states to 
affirmatively repel the spillover effects identified above. The mechanics of such leg-
islation would be relatively straightforward: in essence, state legislation would 
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merely establish that informed consent in the context of abortion is no different from 
informed consent for other medical procedures.  
The law could take several different forms. First, state law could affirmatively 
disclaim any blanket requirement that doctors provide women seeking abortions with 
information relating to depression or suicide (though doctors would remain free to 
provide patient-specific warnings, including warnings pertaining to potential psycho-
logical effects of abortion in individual cases). Second, state legislation could require 
that doctors who provide warnings about the potential psychological effects of abor-
tion pair those warnings with information about possible psychological effects of 
carrying a pregnancy to term—in particular, postpartum depression.  
A solution that requires individual states to ward off the South Dakota effect statu-
torily is in some ways less efficient than allowing Congress—a single player that 
operates within a framework of legal and political checks and balances, and utilizes 
economies of scale—to take action. But in the absence of a congressional will to act, 
individual states, particularly those states whose legal frameworks aim to facilitate 
relatively unimpeded access to abortion, would be well advised to take action.  
In their novel account of horizontal federalism, Professor Heather Gerken and Ari 
Holtzblatt argue that “[s]pillovers are a permanent and inevitable feature of the 
American regulatory landscape”272 and suggest that the interstate friction caused by 
spillovers can in fact be politically beneficial.273 Specifically, it can “spur democratic 
engagement” and drive productive compromise around controversial issues.274 The 
state-by-state solution we envision is arguably an example of just this sort of dy-
namic: the use of state-level democratic processes to deflect unwanted legal rules 
from crossing state lines. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Roe v. Wade, the struggle between women’s constitutional entitlement to 
abortion and state power to regulate that entitlement has been conventionally under-
stood to proceed along vertical lines. The states’ boundaries have demarcated the 
terrain on which abortion restrictions imposed by states have clashed with the repro-
ductive freedom secured by the U.S. Constitution. 
Our account uncovers a previously invisible horizontal dimension of that struggle: 
the medical-malpractice penalties imposed upon doctors for failing to fully inform 
patients about abortion risks; the states’ power to define those risks, along with doc-
tors’ informed-consent obligations and penalties; and, critically, the porousness of 
state borders in this sphere. That porousness, which allows medical standards from 
one state to affect doctors’ practices and informed-consent obligations across state 
lines, can have profound implications both for individuals and for state 
sovereignty.275 
The South Dakota effect is just one dynamic by which abortion access may be 
limited. It is a dynamic, however, that may have serious consequences for women’s 
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willingness to elect abortion and for the experiences of women who choose to go 
forward with abortion procedures. More broadly, it highlights the importance of wid-
ening our focus to consider interstate effects in the context of abortion regulation. 
And as such, it sheds new light on the law of abortion and federalism itself. 
